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Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q] . Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose q; and q3, respectively. Market demand is given by p(Q) = 100 Q, and Q = q1 + (12 + qg. Firm 1's costs are 61011) = lql , firm 2's costs are 62((12) = 2g; and firm 3's costs are c3(4'3) = 2434 Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of ql and q3, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q] and q2. Using these, answer the following questions. a) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q] = 12, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) (1 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) (0.5 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity