1. In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities.

   What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game?

   		(A, Y) and (B, X)
   		(A, Z) and (C, Y)
   		(B, X) and (C, X)
   		(C, X) and (C, Y)

Please help and show the process. Thanks!

In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities. Player 2 X Y Player 1 A B C 1, 2 2, 12 3, ? 0, ? 1,0 3,4 Z ?,4 0,0 3,0 What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game? O (A, Y) and (B, X) O (AZ) and (CY) O (B, X) and (C, X) O (CX) and (C, Y)