1. In, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992), the Court says if the state relies on the nuisance rationale in the case of wiping out use (of land as opposed to personal property), "we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. . . ." The restrictions on use, the Court says, "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." The case must be one where "common-law principles would have prevented" what the regulation itself aims to prevent. What does this mean with respect to the application of nuisance principles when a takings claim is made? Here's a rhetorical question as a hint to deciphering the Court's comments: Does one's title include the right to maintain a nuisance?