in regards to the case below,

1. Examine the ad that is the subject of this litigation and evaluate whether it:

A. is a false or misleading;

B. is undignified;

C. is offensive to you personally;

D. Denigrates the image of the legal profession;

E. would be helpful to someone seeking a lawyer.

2. Make a list of the bars justifications for prohibiting advertising and summarize how the court refutes each one. Do you agree with the bar's arguments or the Court's rationale on each?

3.What kinds of restrictions may be placed a lawyer advertising after Bates?

4.What kind of guidance does this opinion give about other forms of advertising such as email and television?

CASE:

U.S. Supreme Court

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,433 U.S. 350(1977)

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona

No. 76-316

Argued January 18, 1977

Decided June 27, 1977

433 U.S. 350

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

Syllabus

Appellants, who are licensed attorneys and members of the Arizona State Bar, were charged in a complaint filed by the State Bar's president with violating the State Supreme Court's disciplinary rule, which prohibits attorneys from advertising in newspapers or other media. The complaint was based upon a newspaper advertisement placed by appellants for their legal clinic,stating that they were offering legal services at very reasonable fees, and listing their fees for certain services, namely, uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conclusion of a bar committee that appellants had violated the rule, having rejected appellants' claims that the rule violated 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because of its tendency to limit competition, and that it infringed appellants' First Amendment rights.

Held:

1. The restraint upon attorney advertising imposed by the Supreme Court of Arizona wielding the power of the State over the practice of law is not subject to attack under the Sherman Act.Parker v. Brown,317 U. S. 341, followed;Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,421 U. S. 773;Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,428 U. S. 579, distinguished. Pp.433 U. S. 359-363.

2. Commercial speech, which serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking, is entitled to some First Amendment protection,Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U. S. 748, and the justifications advanced by appellee are inadequate to support the suppression of all advertising by attorneys. Pp.433 U. S. 363-384.

(a) This case does not involve any question concerning in-person solicitation or advertising as to the quality of legal services, but only the question whether lawyers may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed. Pp.433 U. S. 366-367.

(b) The belief that lawyers are somehow above trade is an anachronism, and for a lawyer to advertise his fees will not undermine true professionalism. Pp.433 U. S. 368-372.

(c) Advertising legal services is not inherently misleading. Only routine services lend themselves to advertising, and, for such services, fixed rates can be meaningfully established, as the Arizona State Bar's own Legal Services Program demonstrates. Although a client may not

Page 433 U. S. 351

know the detail involved in a given task, he can identify the service at the level of generality to which advertising lends itself. Though advertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to select an attorney, it would be peculiar to deny the consumer at least some of the relevant information needed for an informed decision on the ground that the information was not complete. Pp.433 U. S. 372-375.

(d) Advertising, the traditional mechanism in a free market economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange, may well benefit the administration of justice. Pp.433 U. S. 375-377.

(e) It is entirely possible that advertising will serve to reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to the consumer, and may well aid new attorneys in entering the market. Pp.433 U.S. 377-378.

(f) An attorney who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising, the restraints on which are an ineffective deterrent to shoddy work. Pp.433 U. S. 378-379.

(g) Undue enforcement problems need not be anticipated, and it is at least incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues of the legal profession while also asserting that, through advertising, lawyers will mislead their clients. P.433 U. S. 379.

3. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which represents a departure from the traditional rule that a person may not challenge a statute on the ground that it might be applied unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those before the court, is inapplicable to professional advertising, a context where it is not necessary to further its intended objective,cf. Bigelow v. Virginia,421 U. S. 809,421 U. S. 817-818, and appellants must therefore demonstrate that their specific conduct was constitutionally protected. Pp.433 U. S. 379-381.

4. On this record, appellants' advertisement (contrary to appellee's contention) is not misleading, and falls within the scope of First Amendment protection. Pp.433 U. S. 381-382.

(a) The term legal clinic would be understood to refer to an operation like appellants' that is geared to provide standardized and multiple services. Pp.433 U. S. 381-382.

(b) The advertisement's claim that appellants offer services at very reasonable prices is not misleading. Appellants' advertised fee for an uncontested divorce, which was specifically cited by appellee, is in line with customary charges in the area. P.433 U. S. 382.

(c) Appellants' failure to disclose that a name change might be accomplished by the client without an attorney's aid was not misleading, since the difficulty of performing the task is not revealed, and since most

Page 433 U. S. 352

legal services may be performed legally by the citizen for himself.See Faretta v. California,422 U. S. 806. P.433 U. S. 382.

113 Ariz. 394,555 P.2d 640, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,post,p.433 U. S. 386. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEWART, J., joined,post,p.433 U. S. 389. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part,post,p.433 U. S. 404.

Page 433 U. S. 353

MR JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

As part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of that State has imposed and enforces a disciplinary rule that restricts advertising by attorneys. This case presents two issues: whether 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2, forbid such state regulation, and whether the operation of the rule violates the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth. [Footnote 1]

I

Appellants John R. Bates and Van O'Steen are attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona. [Footnote 2] As such, they are members of the appellee, the State Bar of Arizona. [Footnote 3]

Page 433 U. S. 354

After admission to the bar in 1972, appellants worked as attorneys with the Maricopa County Legal Aid Society. App. 221.

In March, 1974, appellants left the Society and opened a law office, which they call a "legal clinic," in Phoenix. Their aim was to provide legal services at modest fees to persons of moderate income who did not qualify for governmental legal aid.Id.at 75. In order to achieve this end, they would accept only routine matters, such as uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name, for which costs could be kept down by extensive use of paralegals, automatic typewriting equipment, and standardized forms and office procedures. More complicated cases, such as contested divorces, would not be accepted.Id.at 97. Because appellants set their prices so as to have a relatively low return on each case they handled, they depended on substantial volume.Id.at 122-123.

After conducting their practice in this manner for two years, appellants concluded that their practice and clinical concept could not survive unless the availability of legal services at low cost was advertised and, in particular, fees were advertised.Id.at 120-123. Consequently, in order to generate the necessary flow of business, that is, "to attract clients,"id.at 121; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, appellants, on February 22, 1976, place an advertisement (reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion [omitted]) in the Arizona Republic, a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Phoenix metropolitan area. As may be seen, the advertisement stated that appellants were offering "legal services at very reasonable fees," and listed their fees for certain services. [Footnote 4]

Page 433 U. S. 355

Appellants concede that the advertisement constituted a clear violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-101(b), incorporated in Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A Ariz.Rev.Stat., p. 26 (Supp. 1976). The disciplinary rule provides in part:

"(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf. [Footnote 5] "

Page 433 U. S. 356

Upon the filing of a complaint initiated by the president of the State Bar, App. 350, a hearing was held before a three-member Special Local Administrative Committee, as prescribed by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 33. App. 16. Although the committee took the position that it could not consider an attack on the validity of the rule, it allowed the parties to develop a record on which such a challenge could be based. The committee recommended that each of the appellants be suspended from the practice of law for not less than six months.Id.at 482. Upon further review by the Board of Governors of the State Bar, pursuant to the Supreme Court's Rule 36, the Board recommended only a one-week suspension for each appellant, the weeks to run consecutively. App. 486-487.

Appellants, as permitted by the Supreme Court's Rule 37, then sought review in the Supreme Court of Arizona, arguing, among other things, that the disciplinary rule violated 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because of its tendency to limit competition, and that the rule infringed their First Amendment rights. The court rejected both claims.In re Bates,113 Ariz. 394,555 P.2d 640(1976).The plurality [Footnote 6] may have viewed with some scepticism the claim that a restraint on advertising might have an adverse effect on competition. [Footnote 7] But, even if the rule might otherwise violate the

Page 433 U. S. 357

Act, the plurality concluded that the regulation was exempt from Sherman Act attack because the rule "is an activity of the State of Arizona acting as sovereign."Id.at 39, 555 P.2d at 643. The regulation thus was held to be shielded from the Sherman Act by the state action exemption ofParker v. Brown,317 U. S. 341(1943).

Turning to the First Amendment issue, the plurality noted that restrictions on professional advertising have survived constitutional challenge in the past, citing, along with other cases,Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,348 U. S. 483(1955), andSemler v. Dental Examiners,294 U. S. 608(1935). [Footnote 8] Although recognizing thatVirginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U. S. 748(1976), andBigelow v. Virginia,421 U. S. 809(1975), held that commercial speech was entitled to certain protection under the First Amendment, the plurality focused on passages in those opinions acknowledging that special considerations might bear on the advertising of professional services by lawyers.See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U.S. at425 U. S. 773n. 25;id.at425 U. S. 773-775 (concurring opinion);Bigelow v. Virginia,421 U.S. at421 U. S. 825n. 10. The plurality apparently was of the view that the older decisions dealing with professional advertising survived these recent cases unscathed, and held that Disciplinary Rule 2-101(b) passed First Amendment

Page 433 U. S. 358

muster. [Footnote 9] Because the court, in agreement with the Board of Governors, felt that appellants' advertising "was done in good faith to test the constitutionality of DR 2-101(b)," it reduced the sanction to censure only. [Footnote 10] 113 Ariz. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646.

Of particular interest here is the opinion of Mr. Justice Holohan in dissent. In his view, the case should have been framed in terms of "the right of the public, as consumers and citizens, to know about the activities of the legal profession,"id.at 402, 555 P.2d at 648, rather than as one involving merely the regulation of a profession. Observed in this light, he felt that the rule performed a substantial disservice to the public:

"Obviously the information of what lawyers charge is important for private economic decisions by those in need of legal services. Such information is also helpful, perhaps indispensable, to the formation of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the legal system is working and whether it should be regulated or even altered. . . . The rule at issue prevents access to such information by the public."

Id.at 402 403, 555 P.2d at 648-649. Although the dissenter acknowledged that some types of advertising might cause confusion and deception, he felt that the remedy was to ban that form, rather than all advertising. Thus, despite his "personal dislike of the concept of advertising by attorneys,"id.at 402, 555 P.2d at 648, he found the ban unconstitutional.

We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U.S. 813 (1976).

Page 433 U. S. 359

II

The Sherman Act

InParker v. Brown,317 U. S. 341(1943), this Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply against certain state action.See also Olsen v. Smith,195 U. S. 332,195 U. S. 311345 (1904). InParker,a raisin producer-packer brought suit against California officials challenging a state program designed to restrict competition among growers, and thereby to maintain prices in the raisin market. The Court held that the State, "as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." 317 U.S. at317 U. S. 352. Appellee argues, and the Arizona Supreme Court held, that theParkerexemption also bars the instant Sherman Act claim. We agree.

Of course,Parker v. Brownhas not been the final word on the matter. In two recent cases, the Court has considered the state action exemption to the Sherman Act and found it inapplicable for one reason or another.Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,421 U. S. 773(1975);Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,428 U. S. 579(1976).GoldfarbandCantor,however, are distinguishable, and their reasoning supports our conclusion here.

InGoldfarb,we held that 1 of the Sherman Act was violated by the publication of a minimum fee schedule by a county bar association and by its enforcement by the State Bar. The schedule and its enforcement mechanism operated to create rigid price floor for services, and thus constituted a classic example of price-fixing. Both bar associations argued that their activity was shielded by the state action exemption. This Court concluded that the action was not protected, emphasizing that

"we need not inquire further into the state action question, because it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia, through its Supreme Court Rules, required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent."

421 U.S. at421 U. S. 790. In the instant case, by contrast, the challenged

Page 433 U. S. 360

restraint is the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court under its Rules 27(a) and 29(a) and its Disciplinary Rule 101(b). That court is the ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of law,seeAriz.Const., Art. 3;In re Bailey,30 Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29 (1926), and, thus, the restraint is "compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign." 421 U.S. at421 U. S. 791. [Footnote 11]

Appellants seek to draw solace fromCantor.The defendant in that case, an electric utility, distributed light bulbs to its residential customers without additional charge, including the cost in its state-regulated utility rates. The plaintiff, a retailer who sold light bulbs, brought suit, claiming that the utility was using its monopoly power in the distribution of electricity to restrain competition in the sale of bulbs. The Court held that the utility could not immunize itself from Sherman Act attack by embodying its challenged practices in a tariff approved by a state commission. Since the disciplinary rule at issue here is derived from the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, [Footnote 12] appellants argue by analogy toCantorthat no immunity should result from the bar's success in having the Code adopted by the State. They also assert that the interest embodied in the Sherman Act must prevail over the state

Page 433 U. S. 361

interest in regulating the bar.See428 U.S. at428 U. S. 595. Particularly is this the case, they claim, because the advertising ban is not tailored so as to intrude upon the federal interest to the minimum extent necessary.See id.at428 U. S. 596n. 34, and428 U. S. 597.

We believe, however, that the context in whichCantorarose is critical. First, and most obviously,Cantorwould have been an entirely different case if the claim had been directed against a public official or public agency, rather than against a private party. [Footnote 13] Here, the appellants' claims are against the State. The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process.In re Wilson,106 Ariz. 34,470 P.2d 441(1970). Although the State Bar plays a part in the enforcement of the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the appellee acts as the agent of the court under its continuous supervision.

Second, the Court emphasized inCantorthat the State had no independent regulatory interest in the market for light bulbs. 428 U.S. at428 U. S. 584-585;id.at428 U. S. 604-605,428 U. S. 612-614 (concurring opinions). There was no suggestion that the bulb program was justified by flaws in the competitive market or was a response to health or safety concerns. And an exemption for the program was not essential to the State's regulation of electric utilities. In contrast, the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the public. Indeed, this Court inGoldfarbacknowledged that

"[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great, since lawyers are essential to the

Page 433 U. S. 362

primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.'"

421 U.S. at421 U. S. 792.See Cohen v. Hurley,366 U. S. 117,366 U. S. 123-124 (1961). [Footnote 14] More specifically, controls over solicitation and advertising by attorneys have long been subject to the State's oversight. [Footnote 15] Federal interference with a State's traditional regulation of a profession is entirely unlike the intrusion the Court sanctioned inCantor.[Footnote 16]

Finally, the light bulb program inCantorwas instigated by the utility with only the acquiescence of the state regulatory commission. The State's incorporation of the program into the tariff reflected its conclusion that the utility was authorized to employ the practice if it so desired.See428 U.S. at428 U. S. 594, and n. 31. The situation now before us is entirely different. The disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior. Moreover, as the instant case shows, the rules are subject to pointed reexamination by the policymaker -- the Arizona Supreme Court -- in enforcement proceedings. Our concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to state policy is reduced in such a situation; we deem it significant that the state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision is so active.

Page 433 U. S. 363

We conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court's determination that appellants' Sherman Act claim is barred by theParker v. Brownexemption must be affirmed.

III

The First Amendment

A

Last Term, inVirginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U. S. 748(1976), the Court considered the validity under the First Amendment of a Virginia statute declaring that a pharmacist was guilty of "unprofessional conduct" if he advertised prescription drug prices. The pharmacist would then be subject to a monetary penalty or the suspension or revocation of his license. The statute thus effectively prevented the advertising of prescription drug price information. We recognized that the pharmacist who desired to advertise did not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact or to comment on any cultural, philosophical, or political subject; his desired communication was characterized simply: "

I

will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.'"Id.at425 U. S. 761. Nonetheless, we held that commercial speech of that kind was entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.

Our analysis began,ibid.,with the observation that our cases long have protected speech even though it is in the form of a paid advertisement,Buckley v. Valeo,424 U. S. 1(1976);New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,376 U. S. 254(1964); in a form that is sold for profit,Smith v. California,361 U. S. 147(1959);Murdock v. Pennsylvania,319 U. S. 105(1943); or in the form of a solicitation to pay or contribute money,New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U. S. 296(1940). If commercial speech is to be distinguished, it "must be distinguished by its content." 425 U.S. at425 U. S. 761. But a consideration of competing interests reinforced our view that such speech should not be withdrawn

Page 433 U. S. 364

from protection merely because it proposed a mundane commercial transaction. Even though the speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such speech in certain contexts.See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,395 U. S. 575(1969);Thornhill v. Alabama,310 U. S. 88(1940). The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day.See Bigelow v. Virginia,421 U. S. 809(1975). And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,386 U. S. 568,386 U. S. 603-604 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking. 425 U.S. at425 U. S. 761-765. Arrayed against these substantial interests in the free flow of commercial speech were a number of proffered justifications for the advertising ban. Central among them were claims that the ban was essential to the maintenance of professionalism among licensed pharmacists. It was asserted that advertising would create price competition that might cause the pharmacist to economize at the customer's expense. He might reduce or eliminate the truly professional portions of his services: the maintenance and packaging of drugs so as to assure their effectiveness, and the supplementation on occasion of the prescribing physician's advice as to use. Moreover, it was said, advertising would cause consumers to price-shop, thereby undermining the pharmacist's effort to monitor the drug use of a regular customer so as to ensure that the prescribed drug would not provoke an allergic reaction or be incompatible with another substance the customer was

Page 433 U. S. 365

consuming. Finally, it was argued that advertising would reduce the image of the pharmacist as a skilled and specialized craftsman -- an image that was said to attract talent to the profession and to reinforce the good habits of those in it -- to that of a mere shopkeeper.Id.at425 U. S. 766-768.

Although acknowledging that the State had a strong interest in maintaining professionalism among pharmacists, this Court concluded that the proffered justifications were inadequate to support the advertising ban. High professional standards were assured in large part by the close regulation to which pharmacists in Virginia were subject.Id.at425 U. S. 768. And we observed that,

"on close inspection it is seen that the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance."

Id.at425 U. S. 769. But we noted the presence of a potent alternative to this "highly paternalistic" approach:

"That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them."

Id.at425 U. S. 770. The choice between the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers arising from its free flow was seen as precisely the choice "that the First Amendment makes for us."Ibid.See also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro,431 U. S. 85,431 U. S. 97(1977).

We have set out this detailed summary of thePharmacyopinion because the conclusion that Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of the First Amendment might be said to flowa fortiorifrom it. Like the Virginia statutes, the disciplinary rule serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in ignorance. Because of the possibility, however, that the differences among professions might bring different constitutional considerations into play, we specifically reserved judgment as to other professions. [Footnote 17]

Page 433 U. S. 366

In the instant case, we are confronted with the arguments directed explicitly toward the regulation of advertising by licensed attorneys.

B

The issue presently before us is a narrow one. First, we need not address the peculiar problems associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of legal services. Such claims probably are not susceptible of precise measurement or verification and, under some circumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false. Appellee does not suggest, nor do we perceive, that appellants' advertisement contained claims, extravagant or otherwise, as to the quality of services. Accordingly, we leave that issue for another day. Second, we also need not resolve the problems associated with in-person solicitation of clients at the hospital room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue influence -- by attorneys or their agents or "runners." Activity of that kind might well pose dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation not encountered in newspaper announcement advertising. Hence, this issue also is not before us. Third, we note that appellee's criticism of advertising by attorneys does not apply with much force to some of the basic factual content of advertising: information as to the attorney's name, address, and telephone number, office hours, and the like. The American Bar Association itself has a provision in its current Code of Professional Responsibility that would allow the disclosure of such information, and more,

Page 433 U. S. 367

in the classified section of the telephone directory. DR 2-102(A)(6) (1976). [Footnote 18] We recognize, however, that an advertising diet limited to such spartan fare would provide scant nourishment.

The heart of the dispute before us today is whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise the prices at which

Page 433 U. S. 368

certain routine services will be performed. Numerous justifications are proffered for the restriction of such price advertising. We consider each in turn:

1.The Adverse Effect on Professionalism.Appellee places particular emphasis on the adverse effects that it feels price advertising will have on the legal profession. The key to professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that involvement in the discipline generates. It is claimed that price advertising will bring about commercialization, which will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth. The hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the profession's service orientation, and irreparably damage the delicate balance between the lawyer's need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve. Advertising is also said to erode the client's trust in his attorney: once the client perceives that the lawyer is motivated by profit, his confidence that the attorney is acting out of a commitment to the client's welfare is jeopardized. And advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the profession.

We recognize, of course, and commend the spirit of public service with which the profession of law is practiced and to which it is dedicated. The present Members of this Court, licensed attorneys all, could not feel otherwise. And we would have reason to pause if we felt that our decision today would undercut that spirit. But we find the postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such self-deception. [Footnote 19] And rare is the client, moreover,

Page 433 U. S. 369

even one of modest means, who enlists the aid of an attorney with the expectation that his services will be rendered free of charge.SeeB. Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means 152-153 (1970). In fact, the American Bar Association advises that an attorney should reach "a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made," and that this is to be done "[a]s soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed." Code of Professional Responsibility EC 19 (1976). If the commercial basis of the relationship is to be promptly disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it seems inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation of the same information before he arrives at that office.

Moreover, the assertion that advertising will diminish the attorney's reputation in the community is open to question. Bankers and engineers advertise, [Footnote 20] and yet these professions

Page 433 U. S. 370

are not regarded as undignified. In fact, it has been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise creates public disillusionment with the profession. [Footnote 21] The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach out and serve the community: studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel, even when they perceive a need, because of the feared price of services [Footnote 22] or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney. [Footnote 23] Indeed, cynicism

Page 433 U. S. 371

with regard to the profession may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential clients.

It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette, and not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form of public service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and they looked down on "trade" as unseemly.SeeH. Drinker, Legal Ethics 5, 210-211 (1953). [Footnote 24] Eventually, the attitude toward advertising fostered by this view evolved into an aspect of the ethics of the profession.Id.at 211. But habit and tradition are not, in themselves, an adequate answer to a constitutional challenge. In this day, we do not belittle the person who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his mind. Since the belief that lawyers are somehow "above"

Page 433 U. S. 372

trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled.

2.The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney Advertising.It is argued that advertising of legal services inevitably will be misleading (a) because such services are so individualized with regard to content and quality as to prevent informed comparison on the basis of an advertisement, (b) because the consumer of legal services is unable to determine in advance just what services he needs, and (c) because advertising by attorneys will highlight irrelevant factors and fail to show the relevant factor of skill.

We are not persuaded that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be misleading. Although many services performed by attorneys are indeed unique, it is doubtful that any attorney would or could advertise fixed prices for services of that type. [Footnote 25] The only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like -- the very services advertised by appellants. [Footnote 26] Although the precise service demanded in each task may vary slightly, and although legal services are not fungible, these facts do not make advertising

Page 433 U. S. 373

misleading so long as the attorney does the necessary work at the advertised price. [Footnote 27] The argument that legal services are so unique that fixed rates cannot meaningfully be established is refuted by the record in this case: the appellee State Bar itself sponsors a Legal Services Program in which the participating attorneys agree to perform services like those advertised by the appellants at standardized rates. App. 459-478. Indeed, until the decision of this Court inGoldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,421 U. S. 773(1975), the Maricopa County Bar Association apparently had a schedule of suggested minimum fees for standard legal tasks. App. 355. We thus find of little force the assertion that advertising is misleading because of an inherent lack of standardization in legal services. [Footnote 28]

The second component of the argument -- that advertising

Page 433 U. S. 374

ignores the diagnostic role -- fares little better. [Footnote 29] It is unlikely that many people go to an attorney merely to ascertain if they have a clean bill of legal health. Rather, attorneys are likely to be employed to perform specific tasks. Although the client may not know the detail involved in performing the task, he no doubt is able to identify the service he desires at the level of generality to which advertising lends itself.

The third component is not without merit: advertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed decision. The alternative -- the prohibition of advertising -- serves only to restrict the information that flows to consumers. [Footnote 30] Moreover, the argument assumes that the public

Page 433 U. S. 375

is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U.S. at425 U. S. 769-770. Although, of course, the bar retains the power to correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less. If the naivete of the public will cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective.

3.The Adverse Effect on the Administration of Justice.Advertising is said to have the undesirable effect of stirring up litigation. [Footnote 31] The Judicial machinery is designed to serve those who feel sufficiently aggrieved to bring forward their claims. Advertising, it is argued, serves to encourage the assertion of legal rights in the courts, thereby undesirably unsettling

Page 433 U. S. 376

societal repose. There is even a suggestion of barratry.See, e.g.,Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U.Chi.L.Rev. 674, 675-676 (1958).

But advertising by attorneys is not an unmitigated source of harm to the administration of justice. It may offer great benefits. Although advertising might increase the use of the judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action. [Footnote 32] As the bar acknowledges, "the middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately by the legal profession." ABA, Revised Handbook on Prepaid Legal Services 2 (1972). [Footnote 33] Among the reasons for this underutilization is fear of the cost, and an inability to locate a suitable lawyer.Seenn.22 and|22 andS. 350fn23|>23,supra.Advertising can help to solve this acknowledged problem: advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free market economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly 22 andS. 377 for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable. A rule allowing restrained advertising would be in accord with the bar's obligation to "facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available."

ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-1 (1976).

4The Undesirable Economic Effects of Advertising.It is claimed that advertising will increase the overhead costs of the profession, and that these costs then will be passed along to consumers in the form of increased fees. Moreover, it is claimed that the additional cost of practice will create substantial entry barrier, deterring or preventing young attorneys from penetrating the market and entrenching the position of the bar's established members.

These two arguments seem dubious, at best. Neither distinguishes lawyers from others,see Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U.S. at425 U. S. 768, and neither appears relevant to the First Amendment. The ban on advertising serves to increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable ability. As a result, to this extent attorneys are isolated from competition, and the incentive to price competitively is reduced. Although it is true that the effect of advertising on the price of services has not been demonstrated, there is revealing evidence with regard to products; where consumers have the benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than they would be without advertising. [Footnote 34] It is entirely possible that advertising will serve to reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to the consumer. [Footnote 35]

Page 433 U. S. 378

The entry barrier argument is equally unpersuasive. In the absence of advertising, an attorney must rely on his contacts with the community to generate a flow of business. In view of the time necessary to develop such contacts, the ban in fact serves to perpetuate the market position of established attorneys. Consideration of entry barrier problems would urge that advertising be allowed so as to aid the new competitor in penetrating the market

5.The Adverse Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Service.It is argued that the attorney may advertise a given "package" of service at a set price, and will be inclined to provide, by indiscriminate use, the standard package regardless of whether it fits the client's needs.

Restraints on advertising, however, are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work. An attorney who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising. And the advertisement of a standardized fee does not necessarily mean that the services offered are undesirably standardized. Indeed, the assertion that an attorney who advertises a standard fee will cut quality is substantially undermined by the fixed fee schedule of appellee's own prepaid Legal Services Program. Even if advertising leads to the

Page 433 U. S. 379

creation of "legal clinics" like that of appellants' -- clinics that emphasize standardized procedures for routine problems -- it is possible that such clinics will improve service by reducing the likelihood of error.

6.The Difficulties of Enforcement.Finally, it is argued that the wholesale restriction is justified by the problems of enforcement if any other course is taken. Because the public lacks sophistication in legal matters, it may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers. After-the-fact action by the consumer lured by such advertising may not provide a realistic restraint because of the inability of the layman to assess whether the service he has received meets professional standards. Thus, the vigilance of a regulatory agency will be required. But because of the numerous purveyors of services, the overseeing of advertising will be burdensome.

It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point and, at another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort. We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always have: they will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of their profession and of the legal system. For every attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be thousands of others who will be candid and honest and straightforward. And, of course, it will be in the latter's interest, as in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to assist in weeding out those few who abuse their trust.

In sum, we are not persuaded that any of the proffered justifications rise to the level of an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising by attorneys.

C

In the usual case involving a restraint on speech, a showing that the challenged rule served unconstitutionally to suppress

Page 433 U. S. 380

speech would end our analysis. In the First Amendment context, the Court has permitted attacks on overly broad statutes without requiring that the person making the attack demonstrate that in fact his specific conduct was protected.See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia,421 U.S. at421 U. S. 815-816;Gooding v. Wilson,405 U. S. 518,405 U. S. 521-522 (1972);Dombrowski v. Pfister,380 U. S. 479,380 U. S. 486(1965). Having shown that the disciplinary rule interferes with protected speech, appellants ordinarily could expect to benefit regardless of the nature of their acts.

The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, however, represents a departure from the traditional rule that a person may not challenge a statute on the ground that it might be applied unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those before the court.See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma,413 U. S. 601,413 U. S. 610(1973);United States v. Raines,362 U. S. 17,362 U. S. 21(1960);Ashwander v. TVA,297 U. S. 288,297 U. S. 347(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The reason for the special rule in First Amendment cases is apparent: an overbroad statute might serve to chill protected speech. First Amendment interests are fragile interests, and a person who contemplates protected activity might be discouraged by thein terroremeffect of the statute.See NAACP v. Button,371 U. S. 415,371 U. S. 433(1963). Indeed, such a person might choose not to speak because of uncertainty whether his claim of privilege would prevail if challenged. The use of overbreadth analysis reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted.

But the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context. As was acknowledged inVirginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U.S. at425 U. S. 771n. 24, there

Page 433 U. S. 381

are "common sense differences" between commercial speech and other varieties.See also id.at425 U. S. 775-781 (concurring opinion). Since advertising is linked to commercial wellbeing, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.See id.at425 U. S. 771-772, n. 24. Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the scope of protection are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a product or service that he provides, and presumably he can determine more readily than others whether his speech is truthful and protected.Ibid.Since overbreadth has been described by this Court as "strong medicine," which "has been employed . . . sparingly and only as a last resort,"Broadrick v. Oklahoma,413 U.S. at413 U. S. 613, we decline to apply it to professional advertising, a context where it is not necessary to further its intended objective.Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia,421 U.S. at421 U. S. 817-818.

Is, then, appellants' advertisement outside the scope of basic First Amendment protection? Aside from general claims as to the undesirability of any advertising by attorneys, a matter considered above, appellee argues that appellants' advertisement is misleading, and hence unprotected, in three particulars: (a) the advertisement makes reference to a "legal clinic," an allegedly undefined term; (b) the advertisement claims that appellants offer services at "very reasonable" prices, and, at least with regard to an uncontested divorce, the advertised price is not a bargain; and (c) the advertisement does not inform the consumer that he may obtain a name change without the services of an attorney. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56-57. On this record, these assertions are unpersuasive. We suspect that the public would readily understand the term "legal clinic" -- if, indeed, it focused on the term at all -- to refer to an operation like that of appellants' that is geared to provide standardized and multiple services. In fact, in his deposition, the president of the State Bar of Arizona observed

Page 433 U. S. 382

that there was a committee of the bar "exploring the ways in which the legal clinic concept can be properly developed." App. 375;see id.at 401.See also id.at 84-85 (testimony of appellants). And the clinical concept in the sister profession of medicine surely by now is publicly acknowledged and understood.

As to the cost of an uncontested divorce, appellee's counsel stated at oral argument that this runs from $150 to $300 in the area. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. Appellants advertised a fee of $175 plus a $20 court filing fee, a rate that seems "very reasonable" in light of the customary charge. Appellee's own Legal Services Program sets the rate for an uncontested divorce at $250. App. 473. Of course, advertising will permit the comparison of rates among competitors, thus revealing if the rates are reasonable.

As to the final argument -- the failure to disclose that a name change might be accomplished by the client without the aid of an attorney -- we need only note that most legal services may be performed legally by the citizen for himself.See Faretta v. California,422 U. S. 806(1975); ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7 (1976). The record does not unambiguously reveal some of the relevant facts in determining whether the nondisclosure is misleading, such as how complicated the procedure is and whether the State provides assistance for laymen. The deposition of one appellant, however, reflects that, when he ascertained that a name change required only the correction of a record or the like, he frequently would send the client to effect the change himself. [Footnote 36] App. 112.

We conclude that it has not been demonstrated that the advertisement at issue could be suppressed.

Page 433 U. S. 383

IV

In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, and that the advertisement at issue is protected, we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way. We mention some of the clearly permissible limitations on advertising not foreclosed by our holding.

Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading, of course, is subject to restraint.See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U.S. at425 U. S. 771-772, and n. 24. Since the advertiser knows his product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech.Id.at425 U. S. 771-772, n. 24. And any concern that strict requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit spontaneity seems inapplicable, because commercial speech generally is calculated. Indeed, the public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,418 U. S. 323,418 U. S. 339-341 (1974),and Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U.S. at310 U. S. 310,with NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,395 U.S. at395 U. S. 618. In fact, because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising. [Footnote 37] For example, advertising claims as to the quality of services -- a matter we do not address today -- are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be

Page 433 U. S. 384

misleading as to warrant restriction. Similar objections might justify restraints on in-person solicitation. We do not foreclose the possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the consumer is not misled. In sum, we recognize that many of the problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved, and we expect that the bar will have a special role to play in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows both freely and cleanly.

As with other varieties of speech, it follows as well that there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising.See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,425 U.S. at425 U. S. 771. Advertising concerning transactions that are themselves illegal obviously may be suppressed.See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,413 U. S. 376,413 U. S. 388(1973). And the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,333 F. Supp. 582(DC 1971),summarily aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General,405 U.S. 1000 (1972).

The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the flow of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appellants to be violative of the First Amendment.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part.