In the game date night (battle of the sexes) we had two people go on a date. They could either go to a movie or go to a concert, which they must choose independently and simultaneously. Both most prefer spending time together, and so they get 50 utility if they both choose the same option. Player 1 prefers going to the movie and so gets an extra 20 utility for the movie, whether or not they choose the same as player 2. Player 2 prefers going to the concert and so gets an extra 30 utility for going to the concert, whether or not they chose the same as Player 1. Assume that each player has a discount rate of 0.8. A straightforward solution to this dilemma would be for the two people to alternate where they go on dates. Draw the stage game of date night. List all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the single stage game. Consider a two stage version of Date night. Does this show that the solution of alternating where to go (Movie, movie in round 1; concert, concert in round 2) is sustainable? Can you think of a situation in political science that resembles this?