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In the simplified Spence signaling game, is there a separating equilibrium where the low type chooses the high action and the high type chooses the
In the simplified Spence signaling game, is there a separating equilibrium where the low type chooses the high action and the high type chooses the low action?
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Essentials of Business Driven Information Systems
Authors: Paige Baltzan, Amy Phillips
1st edition
1260004716, 978-0073376721
