In this action for injunctive relief under the emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, this order APPROVES the stipulation of the parties imposing injunctive relief.

Statement

At the direction of President George W. Bush, the United States commenced this action for injunctive relief on October 8, 2002, under the emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 176-180. The President invoked the Act to interrupt a lockout by the Pacific Maritime Association and its members affecting 29 ports on the West Coast and 10,500 longshore workers represented by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union. The lockout began on September 27, following a breakdown in negotiations over a new collective-bargaining agreement, the old one having expired over the summer.

Prior to suit, on October 7, the President appointed a board of inquiry pursuant to Section 206 after finding that (1) the lockout affected a substantial part of the maritime industry and (2) the lockout, if permitted to continue, would imperil national health and safety. The board of inquiry issued its report on October 8. The board concluded that the PMA and the ILWU would not resolve the port shutdown within a reasonable time. After receiving the report, the President directed the Attorney General to initiate this action …

Analysis

Section 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:

Upon receiving a report from a board of inquiry the President may direct the Attorney General to petition any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties to enjoin such strike or lockout or the continuing thereof, and if the court finds that such threatened or actual strike or lockout—

(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or with foreign nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and

(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lockout, or the continuing thereof, and to make such other orders as may be appropriate.

29 U.S.C. 178(a). For the reasons stated at the hearing on October 8 … this order finds that both statutory factors have been met.

With respect to the first statutory factor, the lockout at 29 ports along the West Coast and resultant work stoppage have affected a substantial part of the nation’s maritime industry, an industry intimately engaged in “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or with foreign nations.” Specifically, the 29 affected West Coast ports are crucial gateways to America’s trade routes to Asia and the Pacific. Indeed, the affected ports annually handle over 50 percent of the nation’s containerized imports and exports, with a total annual value of bulk cargo at $300 billion.…

The second statutory factor is met as well. The lockout and resultant work stoppage “if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or safety.” 29 U.S.C. 178(a)(ii). This order reiterates the finding made in open court on October 8 that both national health and national safety will be imperiled by the lockout’s continuation. A continuation of the closure of West Coast ports will endanger the national economy and labor force. Key industries directly and substantially affected, as stated, include the transportation and agricultural industries. Continuation of the closure would harm the national economy still recovering from recession.

At the October 8 hearing, the ILWU raised two points. It first argued that the invocation of the Taft-Hartley Act was the product of “collusion” between the United States and the PMA. This was rejected as speculation and, at all events, beside the point, since all persons, including both the PMA and the ILWU, have the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. The focus must be on whether the government has proven the statutory preconditions for emergency relief—not on the politics behind its decision to seek relief. The ILWU’s second argument was that the lockout was on the verge of collapsing and, thus, there was no need for injunctive relief. This was rejected on the facts given the government’s powerful showing of the massive logjam of imports and exports paralyzing the West Coast. Even if the lockout eventually might have collapsed of its own weight, estimating when a voluntary end to the shutdown might have come would have been guesswork. Again, the statutory findings are plainly indicated. That is the end of the inquiry at the district court. United Steel Workers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959).

… [T]he Court has considered on its own whether a Taft-Hartley injunction provoked by a management lockout, as here, can be directed not only at the lockout but also at any future strike or other work slowdown by a union. This case is evidently the first to arise primarily from a lockout. This order concludes that in such circumstances the injunction may extend beyond enjoining a lockout and also may enjoin a strike, including a work slow down. The Act expressly refers to a “threatened … strike” as a basis for an injunction. “The term ‘strike’ includes … any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.” 29 U.S.C. 142(2). The findings of the board of inquiry demonstrate that the lockout was, at least in part, occasioned by work slow-downs in various ports. In this charged environment, it is clear that a “strike” is “threatened” within the meaning of the Act. Although the massive gridlock at West Coast ports is primarily attributable to the PMA’s lockout, and although the lockout will now be enjoined, concerted slow-downs by longshore workers would greatly exacerbate an existing national emergency. Therefore, there is a sufficient basis to extend the injunction to prohibit both lockouts and strikes at this juncture.

Moreover, in the past Taft-Hartley decisions generated by strikes, the preliminary injunctions swept broadly to prohibit both strikes and lockouts, at least insofar as can be determined from the published decisions. At all events, under Section 208 of the Act, the Court has the authority “to make such other orders as may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. 178(a)(ii) …

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, this order APPROVES the stipulated preliminary injunction.

It is so ordered.

The 2002 case was the first case to arise primarily from a lockout by an employer. Did the court have the right to issue a Taft-Hartley injunction not only against the lockout but also against any future strike?