(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Suppose the following stage game G is repeated infinitely: L M R T 9,9 2,20 12,14 D 10,8 1,8 20,6 Let U, be the payoff to player / in period t. Player / (i = 1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by (1-6) E S'-uj, where & is the common discount factor of both players. Suppose that the players adopt the following trigger strategies: 1=1 Player 1: (a) Play T in the first period; in any other period, (b) play T if (T,R) was played in all previous periods and (c) play D otherwise. . Player 2: (a) Play R in the first period; in any other period, (b) play R if (T,R) was played in all previous periods and (c) play L otherwise. What is the lowest value of the discount factor & for which the above trigger strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite repetition of G