Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 0.0/15.0 points (graded) Cooperate Defect Cooperate (a, a) (b, c) Defect ( c, b) (d, d) Here, a = 16,b =1, c =18, d =7. Assume that both of the players are playing the grim trigger strategy. Also assume that the discounting factor for both player 1 and 2 is 6. 1. What is the payoff/utility of player 1 if both players decide to defect all the time? Assume $ = 0.59. Write at least 3 digits after the decimal place. 2. What is the payoff/utility of player 1 if both players decide to cooperate all the time? Assume 6 = 0.65. Write at least 3 digits after the decimal place. 3. Find the minimum value of o for which player 1 will have no incentive to defect on the first stage, assuming player 1 and 2 both are playing grim trigger strategy. Write at least 3 digits after the decimal place