Information for questions 01 to I)? Consider a market with two firms {Firm 1 and Firm 2}, which produce an identical good. Both firms have the same constant marginal cost: ME = m = 40. The demand in this market is given by: Q = HID.2513 :p=44Q Let P: . G1, and TI] denote the price charged by firm 1, the quantity firm 1 produces and sells, and firm 1's profits, respectively. Analogously, let p2, g, and T52 denote the price, quantity, and profits of firm 2, When appropriate, assume the firms split total quantity and profits evenly. Question 07 Again, compare the equilibrium in the Bertrand, Cournot, and Monopoly Collusion cases. Which market structure is the most efficient in terms of total welfare, which benefits consumers the most, and which benefits producers the most? Hint: You do not need to calculate the surpluses: economic arguments and your previous answers are enough to find the correct alternative. (a) Cournot is the most efficient in terms of total welfare (largest total surplus) (b) Bertrand is the most beneficial for consumers (largest consumer surplus) (c) Monopoly Collusion is the most efficient in terms of total welfare (largest total surplus) (d) Cournot is the most beneficial for producers (largest producer surplus)