Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior

Marina Stoshikj

Received: 21 February 2014 / Accepted: 15 June 2014 / Published: 30 June 2014

ABSTRACT

Business talks. How talks are designed affects their result. Style influences process. Ability, information, strategy, and behaviour affect negotiating outcomes. Distributive tactics may hinder stakeholders' cohesive approach. Integration is a team effort. Competitive and cooperative distributive and integrative bargaining. This study examines competitive, cooperative, economic, and social-psychological negotiation. Integration challenges. NSS may enhance integrative conversations.

1. INTRODUCTION

Aims. Budgeting. Rising tensions. Individuals, groups, and organisations differ. Conflict undermines objectives. Both! Negotiations need action and reaction. The (1990). (1990). Flexibility. Colleges, businesses, and governments overlap. Eventually. Raiffa! Smart. He thinks resolving disputes, rivalries, and conflicting interests might benefit society. pastime (Raiffa 1982). Sci-art. Interpersonal skills, judgement, and persuasion impact negotiation outcomes and processes (Raiffa 1982). Begin (1981). Socializing. Integration and dissemination are process-driven. Model, trait, issue analysis. Blending. Effectiveness needs knowledge, engagement, and flow. Teams needed. Negotiate. Rapidly.

2. NEGOTIATIONS AND NEGOTIATION PROBLEMS

Negotiating. It offers examples of the two main argument types and their components and attributes. Basic negotiations help distinguish integrative and distributive components. Parts, models, and problems of distributive bargaining are shown. Next, we explore integrative negotiations' paradigm, agreement types, mutual benefit, and value.

Defining negotiations

Contributions, performances, and earnings. (1975). Negotiation involves give-and-take. Negotiations vs. disputes. Begin competition. Solution-sharing (s). Counteroffers (Thompson 1990). Pruitt concurs (1981). Contrary. Negotiated Negotiation and collaboration rely on the parties' existing and future connection (a husband and wife wouldn't separate over a little quarrel if they could cooperate) (Pruitt 1981).

Basic Features of a Negotiation

The basic features of negotiation, as recognised by Thompson, include the parties involved in the negotiation, the interests they have in the specific situation, the process itself as well as the resulting outcome (Thompson 1990).

Negotiation Parties

Shared interests and preferences (Thompson 1990). Raiffa classifies disputes by side. Disputes may occur. Parties may construct two blocks to negotiate or disaggregate (Raiffa 1982).

Interests

Interests drive negotiations. Valuables. Intersecting interests Bad lump sums Customer wants less, vendor more. Loser. Interest-free. Cooperation benefits everybody. Everybody helps. Follett's sisters like oranges. Orange. Collaborate! Insufficient communication might foster a competitive, not cooperative, mindset, restricting results (Thompson 1990). Variable-sum integration. Itc (Thompson 1990). Inconsistencies annoy Pruitt. Shared (Pruitt 1981).

Talking

Negotiations. Deal-making parties negotiate. Several strategies exist. Below are several.

Contract

Unattainable. Inefficient. Variable conclusions. Who? Duplicate Raiffa thinks mediators require education (Raiffa 1982). Negotiators change results. Expediting? "UK(xk,t1)>UK(xk,t)" (2008) Extreme demands (low standards, concessions) might scuttle discussions. Defeatists? Leavers. Victory (when making low demands). Worst case, he loses more. Mildest. Vs. 2000.

2.1.2 Other Characteristics of the Negotiation Disputes

Negotiations resolve conflicts. Party-hunt. Conversation-changing. Glory (Raiffa 1982). Negotiated Differentiated. Challenges impact flow and technique. Futures, buyouts (xk,t). Integrating problem-value. Fashion-forward. Competition lowers absorption. Problematise Problem-solving slows progress. Flexible (Raiffa 1982). Agreement. Sales fail often. Them. Conflicts occur. Raiffa talks cop pay (Raiffa 1982). Responses vary.

Raiffa valued meaning, intricacy (Raiffa 1982). Pruitt thinks discussions build culture and norms. (1981)

2.2 Integrative and Distributive Negotiation Problems

Subsubsection 2.1.1 were the integrative and distributive type of negotiations named, as existing and resulting due to different degree of compatibility of the interests of the involved parties. This is a division followed by many authors, including Raiffa (1982) who constrains his analyses on two-party negotiations.

2.2.1 Distributive Negotiations-Basic Characteristics, Model and Common Problems

Wants. Contradictions. Maximising supply-and-demand (the buyer). Disputes. Groom requests slow wedding (Raiffa 1982). (1982) Distributions. Singles. Unnecessary private schools (1982) (1982) (1982) False. Geonegotiating. Price minimum Refuse lousy deals. Raffa (1982)

Kersten(2000) backed distributive bargaining. A and B may progress. IX=A,B Kersten talks U-functions. (2001). xfigi (1999) (1999) Reserved buyers/sellers. Damage-zone discussions. Charges change behaviour (Raiffa 1982). (1982) Before negotiations, check opponent's reserve price. Startup. Last (buyer). Culture affects negotiation. Falsehoods. Buyers few. Increased agreements (Raiffa 1982). (1982) Dilute. Distribute. Cars, money, insurance Raffa (1982). Simplification. Complex. Merger. Miscommunication. Realistic negotiations use facts and viewpoints. Combine. Timing may affect distributions. Demand. Afterwards. Thomson, Wang, and Gunia call distributive bargaining "economic-focused." Regulated. Define ultimatum. Ineffective first-second split. Percentages. Countermeasures 2009 (2010).

2.2.2 Integrative Negotiations-Basic Characteristics, Model and Common Problems

Agree. Multifactor contracts finalised, expanded. This challenge decreases competitiveness and boosts teamwork. Integrate. Loss isn't gain. C&S (Raiffa 1982). Raiffa's drawing Negotiated Price matters. Distributed. Cooperation helps. Others sacrifice more. Yielding opponents. Misdistribution. Integrate. Zero-sum (Raiffa 1982). Integrates. Pareto optimisation integrates. Purchase (Pareto 1935). Disappointing orange. Innovating resources (Thomson et al. 2010). 2-week vacation. Negotiating builds trust. Alternatives Analytical skills develop. Aspiring (Pruitt 1981).

Cutting of One Party's Costs

When parties' interests conflict, one loses. One side may strive to reduce the other's costs (rejection, lower prestige, or restricted freedom) to secure an agreement by granting other crucial requests. Decoupling to make the other party feel safer and less vulnerable in the future if making compromises now; safeguarding the other side's public image so they feel included in decision making. A third party may decrease expenses (Pruitt 1981).

Compensation

Negotiating. One party may pay for the other's wishes. Pruitt uses specific, homologous, and replacement (1981). Calm the other side. Equal compensation is homologous. Second, bothersome criteria were missed. Alternative pay costs and has requirements. Find unmet demands and new options to delight everyone. Insecure pay (for example, the benefit of nice reference letter for a former employee). Trust is another issue since it's not always clear which party will initiate a cooperative approach (Pruitt 1981).

Logrolling

In logrolling (and later bridging), both sides' positions must alter to fulfil their interests. Both parties sacrifice to reach a deal. It's possible when people have more worries and prioritise them differently. So, one may give up a low-priority issue for one more important to him, but not to the other side. Compensating criteria characterise logrolling one-sidedly. In logrolling, both parties compensate for a difficulty. Salary and overtime discussions are examples (Pruitt 1981).

Bridging

Neither. Compromising. Valuable. Air. Inspires. Restrict. Visit husband's favourite destination next year. Growth. Another option is insolvency (Pruitt 1981). Randomize. Results! Conflict-avoidance preferences (Pruitt 1981). Integration improves both. Integration helps everybody. Win-win. Averaging their findings is pointless if one side is satisfied and the other unhappy. less (Pruitt 1981). Goal-set. Opinions vary.

2.2.3 Benefits of Integrative Negotiations

Anchor (1981)

Win-win.

Neither side will negotiate.

Interesting ending.

Shared product draws parties, fosters confidence, and leads to integrative agreements and benefits.

Leadership increases goal-setting and productivity.

Integration isn't miraculous. Scenario-integrate. Buy-sell agreements lack choices when mutual benefits change (bigger). Unusual are zero-sum games. Objectives (Pruitt 1981).

Talented. One or both parties may miss the integrative choice and act poorly, therefore the outcome is unrelated to their intentions. Varies. Parallel problem-solving boosts compromise. Capped corruption (Pruitt 1981).

Best-conditioning. The next part discusses two negotiating approaches after recognising how negotiation behaviour influences process and result. Integration/distribution.

3. NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR

Negotiate. Two people solve problems. Each requires the other's interest/approval. Emotions affect talks. Incompatibility impedes integration. Integration is required. Glues. Integration and competition limit common benefit.

Each side causes issues.

After learning successful negotiations, subjects and preparations are discussed. Compares competitiveness and cooperation (1981). Nobody has bargaining rules. Scenario and opponent's perspective might affect behaviour. Bargaining. Examine negotiations.

3.1 Characteristics of an Effective Negotiator

Personal attributes may help a negotiator deal well. Success takes certain skills and actions (Raiffa 1982). Negotiation is tough. Perspectives vary. Raiffa (1982) begins with Karrass (1968) data on 32 US bank executives' negotiation tendencies. Different business disciplines reward different attributes, therefore participants score them based on their job.

Plan

Knowledge-sharing

Uncertainty-proof reasoning

Verbalization

Ear (Adopted by Karrass, 1968)

Age, sex, nationality, social status, and religion impact negotiating behaviour, although Raiffa warns against generalising about all negotiators (Raiffa 1982).

3.1.1 Things to be Considered by the Negotiator Before and During Negotiation

Negotiate. Preparation aids negotiations. Well-argue. As. Unknown. Transparency decreases abuse. Etc. After party and scenario assumptions, negotiator must analyse ambition, BATNA, and reserve price (Raiffa 1982). Desire calms him. None. Disorganized negotiators (Pruitt 1981). BATNA Yes (Pruitt 1981). Bid! First-offer. Leave. False-anchoring. Invest (Raiffa 1982). "Negotiating dancing" produces concessions (reservation or aspiration level). deposit reduction Goals, fairness, and danger determine party behaviour. Strategy (Raiffa 1982).

Parties must negotiate, cooperate, and compete.

Length-dependent. Contraband. Gain/loss. Success-promote. Risky teamwork benefits everybody (Raiffa 1982). Dual autonomy. Negotiation replies include matching and mismatching. Expectations and compromises equal. Unshakable. Negotiations include matching. Competition vs. collaboration (Pruitt 1981). Stop/cursing/etc. Graceful promise-breaking is key. Fearful. Discussions and challenges assist. This is controversial. Intervening. Note. Fairness boosts success and reputation. Negotiations, ethics (Raiffa 1982). decision-making

3.2 Competitive and Cooperative Behavior

These two general types of behavior were mentioned few times during the description of different negotiation problems and within the previous discussion on negotiator behavior. This subsection deals with some general definition of competitive and cooperative behavior, the main types and applicability, and, quite importantly, the reactions of the other party on the specific behavior.

3.2.1 Competitive Behavior

Pruitt (1981) describes competitive conduct as "efforts to obtain unilateral concessions" Successful competitive conduct leads to concessions. When a distributive negotiating issue emerges, competitive conduct is more suitable (Pruitt 1981). Pruitt (1981) identified five categories of competing approaches.

Putting time pressure on the other party

- Deal may fail otherwise. Delay increases risk. This entails setting a deadline or proposing an alternative (e.g. other partner with an attracting offer at disposal). The tactics depend on the opponent's credibility. If the other side doesn't take the threats seriously, the competitor may end negotiations.

Acting firm

- The committed negotiator compromises gradually. Too many demands at the start are risky, but a negotiator may depict his compromises as vital to motivate the other to give in. Slow concessions may appear weak, so the negotiator may compare them to threats that undermine his position.

Reducing the opponent's resistance

- This tactic reduces the opponent's goals or limit. Agreements, threats, or implied assurances drive competition. These strategies rely on the party's perceived firmness, historical reputation, influence on neutral third parties, and capacity to implement the threat.

Principles of prominence

- tactics which are commonly used, but not deeply explored. It is assumed that the competitor builds a case on behalf of an agreement he strives for. For that purpose, he could contribute a lot to the pie that will be further distributed, or push for moral principles.

Positive relationship with the other party

- The competitor attempts to build a favourable connection with the opponent or boost his attitude. He'll strive to show the other party like and identification so they're more willing to concede.

These methods include choosing a nice venue for negotiations, providing favours, and following the other's ideals (Pruit 1981).

Reactions to the Use of Competitive Behavior

Opponent responses have consequences. Both parties' activities effect the result. Time pressure and threats may be detrimental. Positive/neutral: pledges/networking. In heavy tactics, the opponent imitates and fails to respond. Formulation affects perception and behaviour. Promise vs. threat. (1981)

Applicability

Without trust and constraints, the bargainer sacrifices little. Loser-winner. Distributive negotiating occurs when one party is stronger and more competent. Perceived party strength influences this. Competing reduces concessions. Competition affects problem-solving in integrative contexts (Pruitt 1981).

3.2.2 Coordinative Behavior

Coordinating parties find a win-win solution. This is common in the last stages of highly competitive situations, when a negotiation breakdown and poor party relations might otherwise result. Two types of coordination occur during negotiations:

- concession exchange, where parties negotiate differences

- and problem-solving dialogue, where parties are candid, express preferences, and seek integrative agreement (Pruitt 1981).

Coordination is "coordinated activity" (1981).

Trust and openness determine coordinated efforts. Pruitt (1981) ranks their risk.

High-Risk Coordinative Behavior

High-risk coordinative behaviour occurs when a party makes large sacrifices or reveals sensitive information to achieve an agreement. We lose. They want more. Compromising. Threatening may follow learning. The side promotes collaboration early so the opponent can't. Insecure? Opposition motivates (Pruitt 1981).

Moderate-Risk Coordinative Behavior

Collaboration and competition lack trust. Connection warnings. Signs are concessions. Need opposition help. Allow. They can't ignore signals (Pruitt 1981). Problem-solving informally. Drinking? Losses decreased. Unreliable problem-solvers lower session formality. Unity (Pruitt 1981). Cowardly compromisers. His compromises reassure the opposition (Pruitt 1981).

Low-risk Coordinative Behavior

The negotiator can't be too revealing when image loss is severe. He delivered secret messages. He may hint at a casual meeting and see how the other person reacts. He may also handle tiny issues to create a great bond (Pruitt 1981).

Reactions to the Use of Coordinative Behavior

Cooperation promotes integration. The second negotiator may reciprocate if the first makes major concessions. If the opposite side finds the negotiator's approach unacceptable, it may not respond integratively. Discussions focus on strength and ambitions. Improved integration. Cooperation diminishes competition's advantages (Pruitt 1981).

Applicability

Trust promotes teamwork. Low self-esteem promotes collaboration and trust. Submission may result. One side unites when threatened. Winning decreases cooperation. Relationship-based integration. Party-hoppers pay. Happy times! Negotiation limits diminish compromises, boosting competitiveness. Compromise takes teamwork (Pruitt 1981).

3.3 Measures of Negotiation Behavior

Integrative or distributive behaviour is measured. These metrics are examined. Thompson identifies economic and social-psychological measures. The former focus on negotiation outcome as a result of action, whereas the latter investigate negotiation process and social perception. Measures interact (Thompson 1990).

3.3.1 Economic Measures

Negotiation metrics measure result, not procedure. Usefulness. Nash discusses contract, output, and claims (distributive bargaining). When both parties profit, argues Thompson (1990). Everyone needs $600. Prices. Buyer $600, seller $700; no overlap. Profit. Sincere. Integrate. In integrative circumstances, everyone wants more pie (Thompson 1990).

3.3.2 Social-Psychological Measures

Bargaining. Climate influences behaviour. Varies. Stress-free. Context and behaviour influence negotiators' values. Controversial (Thompson 1990). Fairness standardised. Collaboration vs. competition. Integration stifles dialogue (Thompson 1990). Love breeds trust. They assess knowledge, socialability, abilities, and competition. Waiting. Seeing the opponent's abilities, interests, and attributes helps negotiators (Thompson 1990). Psychosocial interventions. Social factors influence negotiating, exploring, and pattern-finding (Thompson 1990).

3.4 Bargaining Styles

Bargaining style mirrors behaviour. "Psy-bargaining" (Shell 2001). Knowing negotiation styles helps negotiators assess their strengths, limitations, actions, and others' behaviour (Shell 2001). In four ways, lit circles negotiate.

character (gender, culture, etc.)

Collaboration vs. rivalry (previously elaborated)

I.Q.

Dual-model.

Shell believes dual concern's behaviour influences negotiations (2001).

Competing: sabotaging others

Collaboration

Careful

Selfless

Avoiding conflict (Shell 2001).

Situations impact bargaining (1999)

4. OBSTACLES IN REACHING INTEGRATIVE AGREEMENTS

Incorporate. Resource-maximizing win-win. Incompatible. (2000)

Inexperienced problem-solving (Walton, McKersie).

Complexity, chance (Antrim & La 1987).

Biases

Negotiating. Cognitive biases and emotional bargaining impede integration, argues Foroughi (1998). (2000)

Biases

Multitasking

Unlikely.

Handyman.

Solutions, dialogue

detail-oriented

Socio-emotional negotiation

Unwavering

Misunderstanding

Beliefs

Skeptical

Feelings destroy relationships. Preferences/issues unknown. Cheapskates. Worsening Planning reduces traffic. Resolutions need opposition. Biases help negotiate. NSS fosters understanding, knowledge, and results. (Bellucci, Zeleznikow, 2006) 1. (2000)

Results

Adaptable.

Identifies issues, options, and solutions.

Optional.

Teamwork decreased.

Word-grouping

Use affects efficiency. Possibilities. Hardest. FBI (Stoshikj & Gregu 2014). aid (Stoshikj et al. 2014).

5. CONCLUSION

Integration/distribution. Summary. Decision-making explained. Uncooperative parties impair discussions. Believes, facts, ideas. Negotiations are cultural. Individualist, collectivist, authoritarian. Complexity highlights patterns. Hypothesise. Experiment systematically. Background, aims, and interests are discussed. No objectives or fear change behaviour. Theorising time and place (cultural, conceptual). Efficiency-boosting.

What is your understanding of 'win-win' and 'distributive' negotiation?