Intensive Margin and Nash Bargaining. Suppose that labor income is taxed at the proportional rate t. One conventional view on how wages w and the intensive margin h are determined in the search and matching framework is via "Nash bargaining," in which both the wage w and the intensive margin h are determined after new matches have been formed. As seen in class, the Nash-bargained surplus-splitting condition for the intensive margin h is 8'(h) -= (1-1) . A. f'(h) u'(c) and the Nash-bargained surplus-splitting condition for the extensive margin is W(w,h) - U(w,h) = (1-1). J(w,h). Just like in class, , and 1 - 7 denote, respectively, the potential new employee's bargaining and the potential new employer's bargaining power, and , is a value between zero and one ne (0,1). Also just like in class, the value expressions for the potential new employee a W(w, h) = (1-t) . w.hog(h) and U(w, h) =b, and the value expression for the potential new u'(c) employer is J(w, h) = A . f(h) -w.h. Based on the Nash-bargained surplus-splitting condition W(w,h) - U(w,h) = (1-1). .J(w,h) along with the value expressions W(w,h), U(w,h), and J(w,h) stated above, solve for an employee's real earnings weh = ... in which the right-hand side does NOT CONTAIN W(w,h), U(w,h), OR J(w,h). (You must determine the term in ellipsis ("...") on the right-hand side.) Display the final solution clearly by drawing a box around it, and clearly and carefully provide the algebraic steps/logic that lead to the final solution