When 10 British Army soldiers on a 10-day training exer cise descended into Low's Gully, a narrow chasm that cuts through Mt. Kinabalu in Borneo, cach knew "the golden rule for such expeditions-never split up." Yet, the fit- test three struggled out of the jungle with a concussion. malaria, and infected wounds 19 days later; two more terri- bly ill soldiers found a village the next day; and the remain- ing five emaciated and injured men were rescued from a cave by a helicopter on day 33. What happened? On a surface level, the near-tragic fracturing of the small group of sokliers trained to stay together for survival group began with a logical division of labor, according fractured into at least four subgroups because they didn't to the training's initiators, Lieutenant Colonel Neill and tnist their leaders or their group, endangering all their lives. Major Foster: and low level of communication, however, trust issues divided the group into subgroups. The initial reconnais sance party established common ground and trust that al- lewed them to complete the mission and reach safety, even though they divided yet again. Meanwhile, the main group that stayed with the leaders in the cave under conditions of active distrust fractured further. We will never know whether it would have been better to keep the group together. However, we do know that this Questions Because the group would be one of mixed abilities, and the young British and NCOS (non commissioned officers] were likely to be fitter and more experienced than the Hong Kong soldiers, the team would work in two halves on the harder phases of the descent. The British, taking ad- vantage of Mayfield's expertise (in rock climbing), would set up ropes on the difficult sections, while he INeill| and Foster would concentrate on bringing the Hong Kong soldiers down. Every now and then the recce (reconnais Nance) party would report hack, and the expedition would o on down in one unit until another recotnaissance party became necessary, 9.31. The review board blamed Neill and Foster. Was this a fair conclusion? Where should blame be apportioned under the circumstances? 9.32. Discuss the group properties presented in this chapter and use them to evaluate the failure of this group. 9.33. When the exercise was designed, Neill created a buddy system based on similarity of soldiers backgrounds (rank, unit, age, fitness, skillk level). The first group out of the jungle were assigned buddies and one other: two lance corporals and one corporal from the same iunit (regular army); ages 24-26 with good fitnes levels; all top roping and absciling (TR&A) instructors. The second group out were assigned buddlies: a sergeant and a lance corporal from the same unit (elite regular army); ages 25 and 37: good fitness levels; both with Commando Brigade skills. The group left in the cave split into: a lieutenant colonel and a ma- jor (buddies); one from the regular army and one from the part time territorial army; ages 46 and 54: fair titness level: one TR&A and one ski instructor. The men reported that from then on, perilous climb- ing conditions, debilitating sickness, and monsoon rains permanently divided the group. A review board found differently, blaming Neill's and Foster's leadership and their decision to take some lessexperienced soldiers on the exercise. No rulings were made about the nearcatastrophic decision to divide the group, but closer inquiries show that this temporary workgroup of diverse members who were not previously acquainted started out with a high level of intragroup trust that dissolved over time. The resulting faullines, based on members' similarities and differences and the establishment of ad hoc leaders, may have been The second faction was the three from the Hong Kong unit-a lance corporal and two privates, all from the Hong Kong unit; ages 24-32: fair to good fitness levels; one with jungle training and two novices. Would you have set up the buddy system Neill did? Why or why not, and if not, what would you have changed? inevitable. Initially, all group members shared the common ground of soldier training, clear roles, and volunteer commitment to the mission. When the leaders ignored the soldiers' con- cerns about the severity of conditions, lack of preparation,