Is the following case an act of Actus Reus/Omission?I need to do the following:

• Attach a link so we can read your set of facts in full ( case below).
• Provide a brief summary of the facts.
• Identify the issue re: Omission

Richards v. Stanley

[S. F. No. 18941. In Bank. June 11, 1954.]

ROBERT RICHARDS, Appellant, v. MANFRED STANLEY et al., Respondents.

COUNSEL

Frank J. Baumgarten and Harry N. Grover for Appellant.

Clark & Heafey, Edwin A. Heafey, Gerald P. Martin and Belcher & Koller for Respondents.

OPINION

TRAYNOR, J.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered when his motorcycle collided with an automobile owned by defendants Mr. and Mrs. Stanley, which was being driven at the time by a thief, defendant Rawlings. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Stanley were the owners of an automobile, which Mrs. Stanley parked on Stevenson Street near Second Street in San Francisco, leaving it "unattended and unlocked with the ignition key in said car lock" in violation of section 69 of the municipal code; fn. * that as a result of this carelessness, defendant Rawlings[43 Cal. 2d 62]"was thereby induced to and did enter said automobile and drove it from its parking place ... into the intersection of Army Street and Potrero Avenue in a careless and negligent manner to the point of impact" with plaintiff's vehicle; that the accident occurred at about 5:30 p. m. of said day when the Stanleys' car driven by Rawlings struck plaintiff as he was driving his motorcycle, throwing him to the pavement; and that "by reason of the premises and the aforesaid carelessness and negligence of the defendants and each of them, there was inflicted upon plaintiff serious personal injuries." The Stanleys' general demurrer was overruled, and they answered denying the allegations of the complaint and pleading contributory negligence. At the start of the trial plaintiff offered municipal code section 69 in evidence, but the trial court excluded it. Plaintiff then sought leave to amend his complaint to state a cause of action for general negligence, but leave to amend was denied. The court then sustained the Stanleys' objection to the introduction of any evidence against them on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and granted their motion for a nonsuit. Plaintiff has appealed.

Although the ordinance provides that it shall not be admissible in evidence or have any other bearing in any civil action, plaintiff contends that it may nevertheless be relied upon as a basis for liability. He bases this contention on the theory that a city ordinance may not validly control the rules of evidence applicable in the courts and that the provision purporting to do so is severable from the remainder of the ordinance. [1] A person may not recover damages based upon the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance, however, unless he is one of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute or ordinance was enacted. (Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel,36 Cal. 2d 493, 497 [225 P.2d 497]; Routh v. Quinn,20 Cal. 2d 488, 491-492 [127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215].) [2] By providing that the ordinance should have no bearing in any civil action, the board of supervisors made clear that the ordinance was[43 Cal. 2d 63]not enacted for the benefit of persons who might be injured by the operation of stolen automobiles, and accordingly, whether or not it could validly affect the admissibility of evidence, it was properly excluded as irrelevant.