Issue: What overarching issue was the court addressing or resolving (one questions not a paragraph just one sentence encapsulating)

Facts: What are the facts that the court described and cared about?

facts section should only include the actual facts of the case.

Rule of Law:What rule please mention the statue, case, legal principle mentioned in the images, did the court apply

* include the actual statutes, constitutional amendments or cases the Court applies the facts USE PRECEDENT FROM THE OTHER ITALIZES CASES

Application- how did the court apply the rule to the facts?

*application section should be how the Court applied the facts to the law

Conclusion: what result did the court reach and WHY?

Florence v. County Burlington

FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF COUNTY OF BURLINGTON _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2012) { C minions andfoomates omitted. ] [The plaintiff was arrested during a trafc stop on an outstanding warrant for failure to pay a ne. The ne was paid but, for some unexplained rea- son, the warrant remained outstanding in the com- puter data base. The plaintiff was initially taken to the Burlington County jail where he was held for six days before being transferred to a second facil- ity. Burlington County Jail procedures required all arrestees to shower with a delousing agent before being placed in the general jail population. Jail ofcials checked them for scars, marks, gang tat- tons, and contraband as they disrobed. The plain- ti' was also instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. He was subsequently taken to a second facility where he was again instructed to remove his clothing while an officer looked for body mark- ings, wounds, and contraband. The ofcer exam- ined his ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, ngers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings without touching him. He was required, as part of the process, to li his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position. After a mandatory shower, during which his clothes were inspected, he was admitted to the facility. He was released the next day when the error was discovered and the charges against him were dismissed. Upon his release he sued, claiming that forcing persons The difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by the courts. Jails (in the stricter sense of the term, excluding prison facilities) admit more than 13 million inmates a year. The largest facilities process hundreds of people every day; smaller jails may be crowded on weekend nights, after a large police operation, or because of detainees arriv- ing from other jurisdictions. Maintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face. The Court has confirmed the importance of deference to correctional officials and explained that a regulation impinging on an inmate's constitutional rights must be upheld "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."interests. The Court's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), is the starting point for understanding how this framework applies to Fourth Amendment chal- lenges. That case addressed a rule requiring pretrial detainees in any correctional facility run by the Fed- eral Bureau of Prisons "to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution." Inmates at the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City argued there was no security justification for these searches. Officers searched guests before they entered the visiting room, and the inmates were under constant surveillance during the visit. There had been but one instance in which an inmate attempted to sneak contraband back into the facility. The Court nonetheless upheld the search policy. It deferred to the judgment of correctional officials that the inspections served not only to discover but also to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other pro- hibited items inside. The Court explained that there is no mechanical way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate's privacy are reasonable. The need for a particular search must be balanced against the resulting invasion of personal rights.The question here is whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervi- sion override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the more invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. The Court has held that deference must be given to the ofcials in charge of the jail unless there is \"substantial evidenc e" demonstrating their reSponSe to the situation is exaggerated. Petitioner has not met this standard, and the record provides full justica- tions for the procedures used. A Correctional oicials have a signicant interest in conducting a thorough search as a stan- dard part of the intake process. The admission of inmates creates numerous risks for facility statf. for the existing detainee population. and for a new detainee himself or herself. The danger of introducing lice or contagious infections, for example, is well documented. The Federal Bureau of Prisons recommends that staff screen new detainees for these conditions. Persons just arrested may have wounds or other injuries requiring immediate medical attention. It may be difficult to identify and treat these problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection. Iails and prisons also face grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang members 1who go through the intake process. "Gang rivalries spawn a climate oftension, violence, and coercion.\" The groups recruit new members by force. engage in assaults against staff, and give other inmates a reason to arm themselves. Fights among feuding gangs can be deadly, and the officers who must maintain order are put in harm's way. These considerations provide a reasonable basis to justify a visual inspection for certain tattoos and other signs of gang affiliation as part of the intake process. The identification and isolation of gang members before they are admitted protects everyone in the facility. Detecting contraband concealed by new detainees, furthermore, is a most serious responsibility. Weapons, drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a jail. Correctional officers have had to confront arrestees concealing knives, scissors, razor blades, glass shards, and other prohibited items on their person, including in their body cavities. The)! have also found crack, heroin, and marijuana. The use of drugs can embolden inmates in aggression toward officers or each other; and. even apart from their use, the trade in these substances can lead to violent confrontations. It is not surprising that correctional officials have sought to perform thorough searches at intake for disease, gang affiliation, and contraband. Jails are often crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous places. There is a substantial interest in preventing any new inmate, either of his own will or as a result of coercion, from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted to the general population. B Petitioner acknowledges that correctional officials must be allowed to conduct an effect tive search during the intake process and that this will require at least some detainees to lift their genitals or cough in a squatting position. These procedures, similar to the ones upheld in Bell, are designed to uncover contraband that can go undetected by a patdown, metal detector, and other less invasive searches. Petitioner maintains there is little benefit to conducting these more invasive steps on a new detainee who has not been arrested for a serious crime or for any offense involving a weapon or drugs. In his view these detainees should be exempt from this process unless they give officers a particular reason to suspect them of hiding contraband. It is reasonable, however, for correctional officials to conclude this standard would be unworkable. The record provides evidence that the seriousness of an offense is a poor predictor of who has contraband and that it would be difficult in practice to determine whether individual detainees fall within the proposed exemption. 1 People detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy Mcveigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killerPeople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing. Timothy Mcveigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killer SUPREME COURT RULES ON JAIL STRIP SEARCHES 157 Joel Rifkin for the same reason. One of the terrorists involved in the September 1 1 attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before hijacking Flight 93. Reasonable correctional officials could conclude these uncertainties mean they must conduct the same thorough search of everyone who will be admitted to their facilities. Experience shows that people arrested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle pro- hibited items into jail, sometimes by using their rectal cavities or genitals for the conceal- ment. They may have some of the same incentives as a serious criminal to hide contra- band. A detainee might risk carrying cash, cigarettes, or a penknife to survive in jail Others may make a quick decision to hide unlawful substances to avoid getting in more trouble at the time of their arrest. .. .{GIL lllblCO- Experience shows that people an'ested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle prohibited items into jail, sometimes by using their rectal cavities or genitals for the concealment. They may have some of the same incentives as a serious criminal to hide contraband. A detainee might risk carry ing cash, cigarettes, or a penknife to survive in jail. Others may make. a quick decision to hide unlawful substances to avoid getting in more trouble at the time of their arrest. This record has concrete examples. Ofcers at the Atlantic County Correctional Facility, for example, discovered that a man arrested for driving under the inuence had \"2 dime bags of weed, 1 pack of rolling papers, 20 matches and 5 sleeping pills" taped under his scrotum. Brief for Atlantic County et al. as Anu'ci (.'m'iae 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). A person booked on a misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct in Washington State managed to hide a lighter, tobacco. tattoo needles, and other prohibited items in his rectal cavity. See United States Brief 25, n. 15. San Francisco ofcials have discovered contraband hidden in body cavities of people arrested for trespassing, public nui- sance, and shoplifting. San Francisco Brief 3. There have been similar incidents at jails throughout the. country. See 2 It also may be difcult, as a practical matter, to classify inmates by their current and prior offenses before the intake search. Jails can be even more dangerous than prisons be- cause ofcials there know so little about the people they admit at the outset. See New Jersey Wardens Brief 11-14. An arrestee may be carrying a false ID or lie about his iden- tity. The ofcers who conduct an initial search often do not have access to criminal history records. See, e. 9.. App. 2359.; New Jersey Wardens Brief 13. And those records can be inaccurate or incomplete. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 752 (1989). Petitioner's rap sheet is an example. It did not re- ect his previous arrest for possession of a deadly weapon. Tr. of Oral Arg. 1819. In the absence of reliable informa- l l Cite as: 566 U. S. 318 (2012) 37 Opinion of the Court tion it would be illogical to require ofcers to assume the arrestees in front of them do not pose a risk of smuggling something into the facility. 5 ' 'II' I The laborious administration of prisons would become less effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded, were the prac- tical problems inevitable from the rules suggested by peti- tioner to be imposed as a constitutional mandate. Even if they had accurate information about a detainee's current and prior arrests, officers, under petitioner's proposed regime, would encounter serious implementation difficulties. They would be required, in a few minutes, to determine whether any of the underlying offenses were serious enough to au- thorize the more invasive search protocol. Other possible classifications based on characteristics of individual detain- ees also might prove to be unworkable or even give rise to charges of discriminatory application. Most officers would not be well equipped to make any of these legal determina- tions during the pressures of the intake process. Bull, 595 F. 3d, at 985-987 (Kozinski, C. J., concurring); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 761-762 (1984) (White, J., dissent- ing) ("[The Court's approach will necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts are poorly equipped"). To avoid liability, officers might be inclined not to conduct a thorough search in any close case, thus creating unnecessary risk for the entire jail population. Cf. Atwater, 532 U. S., atResult 1 of 1 in this book for . . . Officers who interact with those suspected of violating the law have an "essential interest in readily administrable rules." The officials in charge of the jails in this case urge the Court to reject any complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to conduct less thorough Inspections of some detainees based on their behavior, suspected offense, criminal history, and other factors.Result 1 of 1 in this book for The officals in charge of the jails in this case urge the Court to reject any complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to conduct less thorough inspections to some detainees based on their behavior, suspected offense, criminal history, and other factors.IIOUS OIL Even assuming all the facts in favor of petitioner, the search procedures at the Burlington County Deten- tion Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions. The Fourth and Four- teenth Amendments do not require adoption of the framework of rules petitioner proposes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered