Item5 8.33 points eBookPrintReferencesCheck my workCheck My Work button is now disabledItem 5 Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm: Cournot profits for each firm: $ Stackelberg leader output: Stackelberg follower output: Stackelberg leader profits: $ Stackelberg follower profits: $ Bertrand market-level output: Bertrand profits for each firm: $ Collusive market-level output: Collusive industry-level profits: $