. Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His demand is P=320-2Q, where Q is the number of rounds of golfthat he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he Wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the club. a. What membership fee would maximize profit for the club? b. The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the club earn by using a two-part tariff? c. Joe marries Susan, who is also a golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Golf Club. The manager believes that Susan's demand is P=100-2Q. The manager has a policy of offering each member ofa married coLIple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? How does this new pricing scheme compare to Joe's original deal? d. How much more would the club make if it charges Susan and Joe separate twopart prices