just give me the answer please thanks

Amy likes to go fast in her new Mustang GT. Their utility function over wealth is vlw) where w is wealth. If Amyr goes fast she gets an increase in utilityr equal to F. But when Amy drives fast, she is more likelyr to crash: when she drives fast the probability of a crash is 10%, but when she obeys the speed limit, the probability of a crash is only 5%. Amy's car is worth $2000 unless she crashes, in which case it is worth $0. If Amy doesn't have insurance, driving fast isn't worth the risk, so she will alway obey the speed limit. If Amy is offered an insurance contract with full insurance for a premium P with the deductible D, which of the inequalites below is her incentive compatibility constraint that makes sure that she will still obey the speed limit even when she is fully insured? O 0.05U(2000 P D) + 0.95U(2000) > 0.1(U(2000 P D) + F) + 0.90(U(2000) + F] O 0.05U(2000 P D) + 0.95U(2000 P) > 0.05U (0 P D + 2000) + 0.95U (2000 P) O 0.05U(2000 P D) + 0.950(2000 P) > 0.1(U(2000 P D) + F) + U.90(U(2000 P) + F) O 0.05U(2000 P D) + U.95U(2000 P) > 0.05U(0) + 0.95U(2000) O 0.05U(2000 P D) + 0.95U(2000 P) > 0.1(U(0) + F) + 0.90(U(2000) + F) Question 6 {10 points) In a principal agent relationship 0 workers must rely on employers to pay them for effort 0 agents take actions that change the payoff of principals 0 output depends on worker effort 0 principals take actions that change the payoff of agents