Kindly solve this plz

4. {35 points] Russia and Norway both produce oil. Each one can produce either a high quantity or a low quantity. Producing a high quantity drives down the price of oil and therefore harms both countries. This is captured in the following strategic-form game. RussialNonvay High Low High 5,6 12,!) Low 1),\") 7.8 a} Find the Nash equilibrium {there is only one}. b) Find the cooperative {cartel} outcome. Explain why this is not strategically stable. Now, suppose that instead of interacting in the market for oil only once, Russia and Norway does so indenitely. After each period, both countries can tell what occurred in the game in the previoUs period. Each one discounts the future using a discount factor denoted by 5, and 5,, for Russia and Norway, respectively. Moreover, suppose that both coUntries use the grim-trigger strategy of cooperating as long as the other has cooperated, and playing the Nash equilibrium strategy forever if it has not. c} What is the smallest value of 3,, that makes cooperation in every period an equilibrium choice for Russia if Norway does not cheat? You must prove your answer. d) What is the smallest value of 5,, that makes cooperation in every period an equilibrium choice for Norway if Russia does not cheat? You must prove your answer. e} Ettplain any difference in your answer to parts c) and d}