l. [20 points] In a two-player game, let Q be a mixed strategy of Player 1, and R be a mixed strategy of Player 2. Both Q and R may assign (+) probabilities to one or more pure strategies available to Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Suppose Player l's strategy set is {A, B, C} , and that of Player 2 is { D, E, F, G, H}. Dene Q"I = (1/3, 0, 2/3), and R\" = (1/5, 0, 0, 2/5, 2/5). Choose the appropriate phrase to ll in the blanks in the following statements or whether (True/False), whichever applies. Briey explain your reasoning. Answers without explanation will not be evaluate; and will get zero credit. a. If (Q'. R') is a Nash Equilibrium, the payoff to Player 1 is maximized by playing Q\" if Player 2 is playing R". TRUE / FALSE b. If (Q', R") is a Nash Equilibrium, whenever Player 2 is playing R", the payoff to Player I from playing the mixed strategy Q'= (3/4, 0, 1/4) would be HIGHER THAN / LOWER THAN / SAME AS his/her payoff at the NE, (Q*, R\"). c. If (9", R') is a Nash Equilibrium, given that Player I is playing 0", Player 2's payo' from the pure strategy D would be HIGHER THAN / LOWER THAN / SAME AS her/his payoff from playing R'. d. If Q\" is a best-response to R", the pure-strategy A E / IS NOT a best-response for Player 1 against layer 2 playing R"