looking for help for this game theory question.

9. Consider the signaling game below. Nature Types Probability = 5 Type t Probability = 5 Sender Receiver b b a b a b b 1 2 5 Sender 3 Receiver 4 2 2. 5 7 N- 4 3 6 a. Find all separating perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria. b. Find all pooling perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria. 9. Consider the signaling game below. Nature Types Probability = 5 Type t Probability = 5 Sender Receiver b b a b a b b 1 2 5 Sender 3 Receiver 4 2 2. 5 7 N- 4 3 6 a. Find all separating perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria. b. Find all pooling perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria