Meiorin Case $(1)$

government had not demonstrated that it was a bona fide occupational requirement for the job of fire fighting and to ensure the safe performance of work.

In the decision, McLachlin J $($as she then was$)$ outlined the following three$-$step test for determining whether a prima facie discrimination standard is a BFOR, stating an employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing on a balance of probabilities:

that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;

that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate work$-$related purpose; and

that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate work$-$related purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.$[4]$

The Supreme Court of Canada ordered Ms$.$ Meiorin reinstated to her former position and compensated for her lost wages and benefits. Some $15$ years later, the Meiorin case and the resulting standards it established, remain the test of constructive discrimination and bona fide occupational requirements under human rights legislation.

Discussion:

What changes could the consultants have made that would have allowed the test to meet the objectives of the Supreme Court?