microeconomics

QUESTION 6 Suppose there are ten workers that are working on a joint project. Each worker individually takes a decision whether to contribute to the project or not. Let the contribution decision of each worker i be denoted x and so that either x, = 0 or xi = 1. The time and effort spent when contributing corresponds to a monetary cost for each worker of 10000 SEK (and zero for not contributing). The monetary benefit is a share of production and we denote the share each worker gets by Y. The expected earnings of a worker is consequently Y- 10000xx, where Y depends on the effort choices of everybody. For part (A) to (D) of the question, we assume that all workers strive to maximize their monetary earnings. (A) (5 points) What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if the monetary benefit to each worker is 20000 SEK multiplied by the average contribution of all workers, i.e. if Y = 20000*_ x: /10? (B) (5 points) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria if the benefit is 20000 SEK multiplied by the minimum contribution of all workers, i.e. if Y = 20000*min (x1, x2, X3..., X10)