Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 26 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 26 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 13 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Vote Mr. Ward: -13, Mrs. Ward: -13 Mr. Ward: 13, Mrs. Ward: -26 Mr. Ward Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -26, Mrs. Ward: 13 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. O True O False This agreement not to vote a Nash equilibrium