Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 4 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 4 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 2 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward.

	Mrs. Ward
Vote	Don't Vote
Mr. Ward	Vote	Mr. Ward: -2,Mrs. Ward: -2	Mr. Ward: 2,Mrs. Ward: -4
Don't Vote	Mr. Ward: -4,Mrs. Ward: 2	Mr. Ward: 0,Mrs. Ward: 0

The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of

units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of

units of utility.

Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election.

True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question.

True

False

This agreement not to vote a Nash equilibrium.