Need help with this GameTheory question urgently!!!!!!

Three friends are voting on a holiday destination. Each player chooses a destination to vote for, and the winner is the destination with the most votes. If all three are tied, then one destination is randomly selected from the three, where each has a third probability of winning. The players of the game are F1, F2 and F3, and fortunately for us, they all obey the vonNeumanMorgenstern axioms. All three rank a lottery which gives them their worst outcome with 20 percent chance and their best outcome with 80 percent chance as equivalent to getting their secondbest outcome with certainty. The ordinal preferences of the holiday destinations Argentina, Bolivia and Columbia (A, B and C :1 are given by: F1: A>-1B>-1C F2: B}QC>'2A F3: C?3A>-3B. (a) Write this game out as a strategic game where the maximum payoff for every player is 100, and the minimum payoff is 0. [b] For each player, list their weakly dominated strategies. [c] List the six purestrategy Nash equilibria