Networked control systems (NCSs), which embed communication networks into control methods, have been widely applied in various fields, such as uncrewed aerial vehicles, smart factories, and power grids. However, besides bringing data dropouts and network delays, the introduction of communication networks also brings additional and potential vulnerabilities for malicious attackers to intrude and damage NCSs by launching cyber-attacks, for example, the Stuxnet malware against Iranian nuclear facilities, the blackout accident in nuclear power plants, and the massive outage in Brazil's power grid, which generally cause vast losses of property and even life. In recent years, therefore, great attention has been paid to the security issues of NCSs. False data injection (FDI) attacks are a class of typical cyber-attacks against NCSs, and stealthy FDI attacks can cause losses to NCSs while avoiding being detected, which has attracted many scholars. In, an innovation based FDI attack scheme was proposed to maximally degrade the performance of a remote estimator under the constraint of attack stealthies. Then, based on such an attack scheme, the compromised residual with a non-zero mean was considereda side information-based FDI attack scheme. As investigated, both historical and current residual data were considered for construction. Attack signals for the sake of improving attack impacts on remote state estimation. A two-channel stealthy FDI attack scheme was presented, which not only destabilized the closed-loop system but also deceived a residual-based anomaly detector. In optimal stealthy FDI, attack schemes were developed, aiming to inducing system states to specific targets and keeping these stealthy. A selfgenerated method was given to yield stealthy attack signals independent of real-time transmission data. An optimal stealthy FDI attack scheme against measurement outputs was proposed to degrade the control performance of networked systems while evading a Kullback-Leibler divergence-based detector. A sparse, undetectable FDI attack strategy was provided to worsen the estimation performance and destroy system stability without triggering any alarm, even in the presence of sensor failures. Method of constructing sparse stealthy attacks were designed for two typical scenarios: Random attacks where arbitrary measurements could be compromised and targeted attacks where specified state variables were modified. An optimal FDI attack strategy with multiple cooperative attackers based on local information were proposed to reduce the attack cost of each attacker. A stealthy FDI attack strategy against partial sensors was presented. A local topology attack model was developed to determine the feasible attack region of a line by obtaining less network information.

1.1. The false data injection being a typical attack against NCS have been seen as a losses and in no time there will be need for improvement. In your capacity as a software engineering expert, elaborate on the two major professional software development engineering (4 Marks)