Now there are three potential entrants (firm 1, firm 2, and firm 3) that simultaneously make entry decisions. If only one firm enters, the entering firm becomes a monopolist while the other firms that stay out get zero profit. If more than one firm enter the market, they play a Cournot game. The demand in the market is given by P = 6Q. Assume that there is no production cost, but there is an entry cost of 5 as before. a. What are the Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the entry game? b. What is the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each firm enters with a probability p. Now there are three potential entrants (firm 1, firm 2, and firm 3) that simultaneously make entry decisions. If only one firm enters, the entering firm becomes a monopolist while the other firms that stay out get zero profit. If more than one firm enter the market, they play a Cournot game. The demand in the market is given by P = 6Q. Assume that there is no production cost, but there is an entry cost of 5 as before. a. What are the Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the entry game? b. What is the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each firm enters with a probability p