Only answer first two parts

3. Suppose that the city council is considering the provision of a playground at three possible locations, denoted 1, 2 and 3. Each playground costs $6,000 to install. There are three families with kids (A, B, and C). If a playground is installed all families will be taxed equally to pay for the costs and this information is known to the families. The decision whether to install each individual playground is taken on the basis of a majority vote; and, for each family, if the family's valuation is greater than or equal to the cost to them then they would vote in favour of the provision. The table below gives the value that each family places on installing a playground at each of the locations: Location Family A Family B Family C 1 1,500 5,000 1,000 2 2,000 3,000 1,000 3 2,000 2,200 1,000 How would the concepts of 'rivalry' and 'exclusion' apply to this example? [5 marks] . Explain which playground(s) will be installed, and whether the outcome is efficient? [8 marks] . Explain for each of the three locations what decisions would be made using a Clark- Groves mechanism and how much revenue would be raised towards the cost. [9 marks] What is the main advantage of the Clark-Groves mechanism over the simple majority vote? [3 marks]