P02: In the Russian oil industry, such sales of oil to manager-owned trading companies (which often do not even pay for the oil) are evidently common. An even more dramatic alternative is to sell the assets, and not just the output, of the company to other manager-owned businesses at below market prices. For example, the Economist (June 1995) reports that Korean chaebol sometimes sell their subsidiaries to the relatives of the chaebol founder at low prices. Zingales (1994) describes an episode in which one state-controlled Italian firm sold some assets to another at an excessively high price. These instances are the examples of Agency problem (when managers place personal goals ahead of the goals of shareholders). Say, you are newly appointed independent director on any of such companies, 1. What could be the possible ways by which you will control this company's asset transfer to managers? 2. What is the best corporate governance mechanism, you would like to undertake in the company? P02: In the Russian oil industry, such sales of oil to manager-owned trading companies (which often do not even pay for the oil) are evidently common. An even more dramatic alternative is to sell the assets, and not just the output, of the company to other manager-owned businesses at below market prices. For example, the Economist (June 1995) reports that Korean chaebol sometimes sell their subsidiaries to the relatives of the chaebol founder at low prices. Zingales (1994) describes an episode in which one state-controlled Italian firm sold some assets to another at an excessively high price. These instances are the examples of Agency problem (when managers place personal goals ahead of the goals of shareholders). Say, you are newly appointed independent director on any of such companies, 1. What could be the possible ways by which you will control this company's asset transfer to managers? 2. What is the best corporate governance mechanism, you would like to undertake in the company