Paraphrasing a challenging passage.

A metaphor is a literary style that writers use to make their writing more evocative. Without going into wordy explanations, a writer can use the figurative language of a metaphor for illustrative purposes or to highlight the similarities between two different ideas, activities, or objects. Paraphrasing a metaphoric passage is challenging because you (the writer doing the paraphrasing) need to be able to first understand what you've read and next be able to explain what you've read.

QUESTION: Paraphrase this passage from Warren's masterpiece 'Killing kripkenstein's monster' without using any metaphors.

KILLING KRIPKENSTEIN'S MONSTER.

JARED WARREN.

For over thirty years a monster has lumbered through the philosophical landscape laying waste to naturalistic, broadly dispositional approaches to rule-following, meaning, and content. The monster is terrifying; the mere mention of his name is often enough to inspire retreat. If the forces of naturalism are ultimately to prevail. Kripkenstein's monster must be killed, once and for all. Here I attempt this dangerous and perhaps foolhardy task. But why now? Couldn't the monster have been killed back in the eighties? In principle: yes. But in reality: perhaps not. Many attacks were launched, and while some did significant damage, none fully succeeded. Additionally, several adventurers have rallied to the monster's cause in the intervening years, bolstering his already formidable attacks. And let us not dwell on the many raiding parties forever lost in the bog of Wittgenstein exegesis surrounding the monster's lair.

Fantastical analogies aside, here I defend dispositionalism in the face of Kripke's influential anti-dispositionalist arguments in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Leaving aside both Wittgenstein exegesis and the "sceptical" solution, I will focus only on showing how dispositionalism, broadly construed, with- stands Kripke's attacks. Two of Kripke's arguments those concerning finitude and error-purport to show that dispositionalism has problems extensionally accounting for the meanings we deploy and the rules that we follow, while the third-that concerning normativity-purports to show that even if the extensional challenge is met, dispositionalism cannot hope to account for the normativity involved in meaning and rule-following. I will answer Kripke's challenges by introducing various novelties and extending and combining extant ideas.

Though the title of Kripke's book might suggest that his discussion is only about rule-following, in actuality it is largely concerned to undermine factualism about meaning and content. Following Kripke, my main focus will be on meaning until the final section, where I return to general issues of rule-following in light of the preceding discussion. My central theme is that Kripkenstein's attacks only succeed if dispositionalism is simplified to the point of caricature. Once it is realized that additional complications at a general level sap the force of Kripkenstein's attacks, the way is cleared for specific dispositionalist theories of meaning and rule- following in all of its forms. My goal is lofty: I aim to produce a canonical answer to Kripkenstein's general case against dispositionalism, without any handwaving. If I succeed, my discussion will shield every plausible version of dispositionalism from these attacks; if I don't, then the monster will have claimed yet another victim.