Part 1 {2.3 points} 0 See \""35 Assume there are three partnering countries who control all of the world's supply of oil. Inverse demand for oil is given by the equation P = 100 262. where .F" is the per-unit price of oil and Q is the quantity. Marginal costs are identical across countries atl$~24 per unit of oil. These three partnering countries form a cartel and act as a monopolist to maximize prots What quantity do they choose? What per-unit price do they set? 5 , _ _ If they split prot three ways. what Is the mm of each country? S (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part2 {0.3 point] 0 %EW Assuming country 1 and country 2 continue colludlng as In Part 1. does country 3 have an incentive to cheat on the agreement in a one- shot game? Choose one: C' A. No, because the other countries will retaliate and punish any cartel defector. O 8. Yes. it can increase production and increase prot. Cl C. Yes. it can decrease production and increase prot. [} O D. No. if it increases production than prot will be decreased