Part A: Assessing the Rules

Consider the fictional section 28 of the Dangerous Dogs 1934 which holds that:

"The owner of an animal is guilty of an offence if their animal is present in a public place and is not on a leash or otherwise under effective control"

What do the following terms mean?

• Animal
• Public Place
• Control

• What are the common sense definitions of each of these terms?
• What public policy interests are being balanced by the Act?
• What legal sources can be used to help in these definitions?
• How far should the law go to regulate social problems in this area?
• How might criminal laws like the Dangerous Dogs Act be balanced with civil liability such as the law of negligence?
• When interpreting words, how important is the purpose that they will be used for?

Part B: Applying the Rules

Consider each of the following indictments and make an argument for the defence or

prosecution based on the fictional legal sources attached below.

1 Defendant is accused of walking a guide dog in a shopping centre. The defendant is a

guide dog trainer and the dog has substantially completed its training. The dog has a dog

harness but not a lead and collar. There was a ruckus caused by another dog snapping

at the guide dog which responded by breaking free from the trainer and barking at the

other dog. There were no injuries.

2 Defendant is accused of causing a cat to be present on a golf course. The golf course

is a private club, but as a matter of practice members of the community exercise on

the course after business hours (with or without dogs) and the club does not take steps

to keep them out. The owner claims that the cat cannot wear a lead but is obedience

trained.

3 Defendant owns farmland which he has rented out to the 'Mudman Music Festival' for the

first time. During the festival a Fox Terrier is disturbed by the light show and breaks out

of its pen and trips over a member of the public who falls and breaks his leg. The farmer

breeds fox terriers as a hobby and this animal is not kept as a pet.

Legal Sources

The Common Law Rules

Doberman v Staffordshire 1837

A farmer is not liable for damage caused by livestock unless the livestock falls into the

category of a 'dangerous animal'. In this case an aggressive goose was not considered to be

dangerous

Pomeranian v Cavalier 1890

This case concerns an attack by a dog. The rule is Doberman v Staffordshire does not apply

because (a) the dog is a pet and not livestock and (b) it is prima facie to be considered

dangerous. The dog's owner was held liable.

Legislation

The Dangerous Dogs Act 1934

• Preamble: This act concerns the unsettled common law position regarding the liability of pet owners for breaches of public safety and the public peace. This act concerns the balancing of rights of enjoyment which pertain to users of public space.
• S 28 The owner of an animal is guilty of an offence if their animal is present in a public place and is not under control.
• S 117 The Dog Catcher is delegated authority to make rules regarding the regulation of public places under the act.
• The terms 'animal', 'dog' and 'dangerous' are not defined in the act.

The Dangerous Dogs Act Amendment Act 1962

• Amends section 28. Replaces the clause 'not under control' with 'not on a leash or otherwise under effective control'
• Adds section 11(d) which defines a public place as an area to which members of the public have habitual access which is known to the land's owner.

Dangerous Dogs Regulations 1982

Defines a list of dangerous dogs including pit bulls, Dobermans, Alsatians, Akitas, bull terriers and Australian Cattle Dogs

Makes a determination that public places include shopping centre parking lots, sporting fields, public bars, arts events in temporary accommodation.

Defines a lead and collar as mandatory for effective control of a dog

Cases

R v Malamute 1944

This case considered whether the Dangerous Dogs Act 1934 applied to a pet goat which was present on private land during a music recital where members of the public had access. The majority 2:1 held that the act did not apply

Justice Affenpinscher

The Act did not apply

The farm was public land as members of the public were invited in.

Goat is not a dog or an animal for the purposes of s 28 because it was livestock, using

the common law rule in Doberman v Staffordshire.

Justice Beagle

The Act did not apply

The farm could not be public land. It would be absurd for the act to apply to someone

A Goat is capable of being an animal for the purposes of s28 as it does not specify that

it has to be a dog.

Justice Cardigan

The Act did apply

The land was public land because steps were not taken to exclude members of the

public

A goat is an animal for the purposes of s28

R v Munsterlander 1975

Concerns Chihuahua in a handbag a shopping centre parking lot

Considers 1962 amendments regarding public place

Held 2:1 the act does not apply

Justice Beagle

Act did not apply

Land was not public land as there were rules governing occupation and the

management reserved the right to exclude nuisances and to tow the cars of people

who were not customers of the centre.

A handbag would be "under control" for the purposes of the act.

The act would apply to a Chihuahua. While section 28 does not refer to danger, it is

clearly the intention of parliament. Dangerous is judged on the aggressiveness of a

dog regardless of how much damage it is likely to cause.

Justice Dachshund

Act did not apply

Land was not public land

The Act would not apply to a Chihuahua. The dangerousness of an animal is judged

on the damage it would cause to a person if attacked.

Justice Eurohound

Act did apply

Land was public land under the act. The act is concerned with the facts of whether or

not members of the public actually use the land, not their legal status.

The act would apply to a Chihuahua. While the act title refers to 'dangerous' animals,

the section does not require an animal to be proven dangerous in any way.

Reflective Seeds

• How do statutory laws, regulations and case law work together? Where is there potential friction? Julia Black talks about 'regulatory conversations' and this can be a useful way of thinking about legal change which emphasises the importance of getting the sequence of authorities clear.
• How likely is real ambiguity in the law? Why do you think terms like 'reasonable' are used so often? Could examples of this kind of in-built flexibility have helped in resolving this scenario?
• Why is there a gap between 'common sense' meanings of words and the legal meanings? How does your position in arguing