Part C: Entry Game with Stackelberg Capacity Competition Now consider a sequential entry game with capacity competition. First, firm B chooses whether to enter and chooses its capacity qB. Then, firm A chooses whether to enter and chooses qA. As before, the market demand is p=20(qA+qB). Entry costs and marginal costs are also the same as before. (j) Suppose B enters and chooses qB. For what values of qB is it optimal for firm A to enter? (5pts) (Hint: Suppose firm A enters. What quantity qA does firm A choose? What is the price? What is the operating profit of firm A ?) (k) Given firm A's best response, what does firm B choose? (5pts) (l) How do consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus compare in Parts A, B, and C? Provide intuition. (5pts) Part C: Entry Game with Stackelberg Capacity Competition Now consider a sequential entry game with capacity competition. First, firm B chooses whether to enter and chooses its capacity qB. Then, firm A chooses whether to enter and chooses qA. As before, the market demand is p=20(qA+qB). Entry costs and marginal costs are also the same as before. (j) Suppose B enters and chooses qB. For what values of qB is it optimal for firm A to enter? (5pts) (Hint: Suppose firm A enters. What quantity qA does firm A choose? What is the price? What is the operating profit of firm A ?) (k) Given firm A's best response, what does firm B choose? (5pts) (l) How do consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus compare in Parts A, B, and C? Provide intuition. (5pts)