Parts a, b, and c

1D. In the payoff matrix below the rows correspond to player A's strategies and the columns corrmpond to player Bis strategies. The rst entry in each box is player A's payo and the second entry is player E's payoff. is] (h) PlayerB L R U Pla a W 13 Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Notice from the payoff matrix above that Player A's payo from the pair of strategies (U, L} is 3. Can you change player A's payoff from this pair of strate gies to some nonnegative number in such a way that the resulting game has no purestrategy Nash equilibrium? Give a brief {13 sentence) explanation for your answer. [Note that in answering this question, you should only change Player A's payoif for this one pair of strategies {IL L}. In particular, leave the rest of the structure of the game unchanged: the players, their strategies, the payoff from strategies other than (U, L}, and His payo from (U, 45).} Now let's go back to the original payoif matrix from part (a) and ask an analogous question about player B. So we're back to the payn matrix in which players A and E each get a payo of 3 from the pair of strategies {[Jr, L}. Can you change player Bis payoE from the pair of strategies (U, L} to some non negative number in such a way that the resulting game has no purestrategy Nash equilibrium? Give a brief [13 sentence] explanation for your answer. (Again, in answering this question, you should only change Player E's payo' for this one pair of strategies (U, L]. In particular, leave the rest of the structure of the game unchanged: the players, their strategies, the payoff from strategies other than (U, L], and A's payn' from (U, Ll]