Player 2 Player 1 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 3. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? b) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 3. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? c) (1 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 3. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? d) (05 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 11. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? I e) (0.5 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 11. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? I f) (1 marks) Suppose x = 2 and y = 11. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? D