Please Answer it only for PART D

1. Kemer Country Golf Club is the only golf club operating in Istanbul. The following are monthly demand curves by two distinct types of customers for golf games. Q: - 20 - 2P, where Qi is the number of golf games demanded by the customer of type 1 and P is the price per game. Similarly the demand curve of the customer type 2 is Q2 - 16 - P. Club's marginal cost per game is constant and is MC-S2. (a) Assume that the club management considers a uniform price for each golf game. What is the price charged per game? How many games are played? What would be the monthly profits if there were 50 customers of type 1 and 50 customers of type 2? (b) The club management is confident that they can easily identify customers of cach type and prevent arbitrage opportunities among them. Assume that now they consider 3rd degree price discrimination. How many games cach type of consumer plays and how much each type of consumer pay per game. What would be the total games played and monthly profit if there were 50 customers of type 1 and 50 customers of type 2? (c) The club management is confident that they can easily identify customers of cach type and prevent arbitrage opportunities among them. Assume now they consider menu (or block) pricing (so many game tokens for this many games), What type of menu would be offered to each type of customer. What would be the total games played and monthly profit if there were 30 customers of type 1 and 50 customers of type 2? (d) Club management just realizes that they can not identify different customer types and can not prevent arbitrage opportunities among them. Is there still an opportunity to provide two different menus? Why or why not? What would be the menu now? What is the total number of games played by 50 customers of type 1 and 50 customers of type 2? What would be the monthly profit of the monopolist