Please answer number 4.

c. In this scenario, the regulatory board, imposed a price ceiling on the Onus ferry operator that was calculated to be weli above the ferry owner's lowest AVC and well above the ferry owner's lowest ATC. Explain in significant detail, what will be the short run and long run impacts of such a price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator's profits and continued ability to provide service to the inhabitants of the east coast island of Onus. llla l _. aim lIII llll ' ,1 i [A'Ill l: l .5\" I 'l Elaalli Ill l 3 IF II III 2 a -- .- E- oEE .Mz '01- '1' E! emu 4. Dr. Fine and Dr. Feelgood are the only two medical doctors offering immediate walk-in medical services in a small rural town. They operate in a two firm oligopoly. Each doctor can charge either a high price or a low price for a standard medical visit. Figure 1 shows their possible profits, based on each doctor's pricing strategy. Figure 1 a. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, explain why the Nash Noncooperative Equilibrium pricing strategy is the safest choice when there is only a single period in which to choose a price and the likely actions of the competitor are unknown. b. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, complete the following table to depict the two period pricing situation when Dr. Fine always plays \"Tit-for-Tat" and Dr. Feelgood always plays "Tit-for-Tat." Payoffs SECO N D Period Pa yoffs TOTAL FIRST Perlod Payoffs Charges Charges (high or low) (high or low) Fine Fine ' Feelgood Feelgood