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[Sequential Hotelling Model] (5 points each, 15 points total) Two independent ice cream vendors own stands at either end of a 1-mile long beach. Every day there are 1000 beach- goers who come to the beach and distribute themselves uniformly along the water. Every beach-goer one wants exactly one ice cream during the day and values the ice cream from both stands at $100. All of the beach-goers would rather be sunbathing or in the water, so they have a disutility to walking on the beach of $2 per mile. Early's Ice Cream, the rm at location 0, is an early riser and always posts his price rst. Cali Creamery, at location 1, is more laid back and posts her price just before the beach opens (the beach requires all prices to be posted by the time the beach opens). Both rms have a marginal cost of $ 4 per ice cream. Questions: 1, What is the demand for Early's Ice Cream and Cali Creamery, given their prices p0 and pl? 2, What is Cali Creamery's best response function when Early's posts a price of p0? 3, What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this market