Please complete all parts if possible

. In the following game tree (aka. extensive form game), the feasible strategies (i.e. possible actions) are represented by nodes 1, 1a, and 1b for Firm 1, and nodes 2a and 2b for Firm 2. . Payoffs (or profits) for Firm 1 and Firm 2 are given by the values in parentheses, where, for any strategy set, Firm 1 receives the payoff to the left of the comma, and Firm 2 receives the payoff to the right of the comma. (98, 90) Firm 1 (1a) (102, 100) Firm 2 (2a) (101, *97) Firm 1 (1) (97, 87) Firm 2 (2b) (93, 95) Firm 1 (1b) (97, 105) Determine the resulting profit for each firm. (a) Firm 1's choice at node 1a results in profit of for Firm 1 and profit of for Firm 2. (b) Firm 1's choice at node 1b results in profit of for Firm 1 and profit of for Firm 2. (c) Firm 2's choice at node 2a results in profit of fof Firm 1 and profit of for Firm 2. (d) Firm 2's choice at node 2b results in profit of for Firm 1 and profit of for Firm 2. (e) The equilibrium will be determined by Firm 1's choice at node 1. Firm 1's choice at node 1 will result in profits of for Firm 1 and for Firm 2