please do all parts in 25 minutes please urgently and give only final answer no need to explain... I'll give you up thumb definitely

Question 12-17 are based on this game, where firms A and B must independently decide whether to charge high or low prices. Farm B L Price High Price Low Price 00 50.-10 Firm High Price -1050 20.20 12. Find the dominant strategies for Firm A and Firm B respectively if possible? (high price, low price). neither firm has a dominant strategy. O (low price, high price). 0 (low price, low price). 12. Find the dominant strategies for Firm A and Firm B respectively if possible? (high price, low price). O neither firm has a dominant strategy. (low price, high price). (low price, low price). 13. Which of the following are Nash equilibrium payoffs in the one-shot game? O (50,-10 O (0,0) O (-10, 50) O (20, 20) 14. Which of the following are the Nash equilibrium payoffs (each period) if the game is repeated 10 times? O (-10, 50) O (50, 10) - O (20, 20) O (0,0) 15. Suppose the game is infinitely repeated, and the interest rate is 10%. Both firms agree to charge a high price, provided no player has charged in low price in the past. If both firms stick to this agreement, then the present value of Firm A's payoffs are: O 550 O 110 O 220 O 330 16. Suppose that Firm A deviates from a trigger strategy to support a high price. What is the present value of A's payoff from cheating? 30 50 17. What is the maximum interest rate that can sustain collusion? O 66.7% O 20% O 30% O 15% Question 12-17 are based on this game, where firms A and B must independently decide whether to charge high or low prices. Farm B L Price High Price Low Price 00 50.-10 Firm High Price -1050 20.20 12. Find the dominant strategies for Firm A and Firm B respectively if possible? (high price, low price). neither firm has a dominant strategy. O (low price, high price). 0 (low price, low price). 12. Find the dominant strategies for Firm A and Firm B respectively if possible? (high price, low price). O neither firm has a dominant strategy. (low price, high price). (low price, low price). 13. Which of the following are Nash equilibrium payoffs in the one-shot game? O (50,-10 O (0,0) O (-10, 50) O (20, 20) 14. Which of the following are the Nash equilibrium payoffs (each period) if the game is repeated 10 times? O (-10, 50) O (50, 10) - O (20, 20) O (0,0) 15. Suppose the game is infinitely repeated, and the interest rate is 10%. Both firms agree to charge a high price, provided no player has charged in low price in the past. If both firms stick to this agreement, then the present value of Firm A's payoffs are: O 550 O 110 O 220 O 330 16. Suppose that Firm A deviates from a trigger strategy to support a high price. What is the present value of A's payoff from cheating? 30 50 17. What is the maximum interest rate that can sustain collusion? O 66.7% O 20% O 30% O 15%