Please explain how to solve part 3, part 5, and part 6 with an explanation thank you

A rm is looking to hire a worker with complete college education. There are two types of such workers: high-productivity, with marginal productivity of 10, and low-productivity, with marginal productivity of zero. Out of all students completing college, a fraction pp, has high productivity, and the rest (p; = 1 pk] have low productivity. The rm is risk-neutral. That is, it only cares about expected prots associated from hiring a worker: the difference between the expected productivity and the wage. 3. Keep assuming that the rm cannot observe the worker's type, but now consider a different situation. Suppose that, out of all high-productivity students, a fraction 0' secures a job before graduating (possibly due to internships), so they don't go into the unemployed pool. None of the low productivity workers secure jobs before graduating. The rm is considering hiring a candidate who is unemployed some time after graduating. What is the highest wage it should offer to that candidate to avoid negative expected prots? 5. Suppose that rms cannot observe workers' types. Suppose a high school student knows for sure they'll be of the low type is choosing between different universities. Based on the answer from item 3, and assuming that o is the same at all universities, should this high school student choose a school with a higher or lower share of high productivity students pk? 'Why? Hint: a higher 1}}, does not mean the student will learn more. The student in this question is sure they 'H be low productivity, so p}. only aects the student's outcomes due to unobserved types at the labor market. 6. Now repeat the analysis for a high school student who knows for sure they will be of the high productivity type. Would this student prefer to go to a university with a higher or lower pk? Assume that high productivity workers who get jobs before graduating are paid 10