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4. (3 points) Two firms produce a homogeneous good at price p. Total production is Q = q1 + 92 where for j = 1, 2, q, is the production of firm j. The inverse demand function is p = D (Q) such that D (Q) = Q-2, (5) where & > 1. For j = 1, 2, the total cost function for firm j is TC (q;) = cq; where C > 0. (a) Set up each firm's maximization problem. (0.5 points) (b) Find the best-response functions for firms 1 and 2. (1 point) (c) Find the Cournot equilibrium, {qf, q2, p"}. (1 point) (d) Is there a Cournot equilibrium if c = 0. Explain. (0.5 points)