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Consider a firm which is a monopolist in two markets. In the first marketI demand is given by Q = Pi" , while demand in the second market is given by Q; = 2? P1. The monopolist faces a constant marginal cost of c. No matter what the value of c is, the monopolist will never charge a price in market 2 below Now suppose that c = 1. If the monopolist sets Pl = P1, that means that the absolute value of .9 equals Now suppose that in market 2 (where demand is given by is given by @2 = 27 - P2), the market structure is not a monopoly but rather an oligopoly that works as follows. First, Firm 1 chooses q1 . Firm 2 and Firm 3 observe the q, that has been chosen, and then simultaneously choose q2 and 43 . All 3 firms have constant marginal cost of production of 1. If q1 = 1, what q2 will Firm 2 choose? Answer: Continue to assume that the market structure in market 2 is the oligopoly described in the previous part. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, what q, will Firm 1 choose in the beginning of the game? Answer: Still assuming that the market structure in market 2 is the oligopoly described previously. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Firm 2 and Firm 3 produce the same quantity. What is the quantity produced by each of these two firms? (Note: you are not asked for the sum of q2 and q; here, rather you are meant to find to find the value of q2 , which will be equal to q; in equilibrium)