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3. Consider this game described in strategic form, where Player 1 chooses strategy, A,B,C, or D and Player 2 chooses W,X,Y or Z. MEI\"ml \\I-I-EEII lEl-mll A) What strategies can be eliminated if both players are rational and both know the payoffs to each player from all strategies, but neither player knows if the other player is rational? B) What strategies can be eliminated if both players are rational, both know the payoffs to each player from all strategies, and if each knows that the other player is rational, but Player 1 does not know whether Player 2 knows that Player 1 knows that Player 2 is rational? C) What strategies can be eliminated if it is common knowledge that both players are rational and know the payoffs to each player from all strategies? D ) Explain how a Nash equilibrium for this game can be found by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. What are the strategies in this Nash equilibrium