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Please help me. 3. Modify the two-bidder example above and allow only three possible bids, 0, 1=2, or 1. (a) In a first-price auction, what

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3. Modify the two-bidder example above and allow only three possible bids, 0, 1=2, or 1. (a) In a first-price auction, what are the symmetric Nash equilibria? 1 (b) In a second-price auction, is bidding one's true valuation still a weakly dominant strategy? Conclude whether or not the strategy profile in which each bidder bids one's true valuation is a Nash equilibrium. Are there other symmetric Nash equilibria

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