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A seller is bargaining to sell a good to a buyer. The good is WDI'tlJ $0- to the seller and $1 to the buyer. The bargaining is in two periods. in period 11 one part3r is chosen with probability 1,32 to propose a sale price. The other partyr then accepts or rejects. Acceptance results in sale 1with the proposed price. Rejection moves the game to the second period. In the second period, one party is again chosen 1with probabilityr If?! to propose a sale price, and the other part5].r accepts or rejects. Acceptance results in sale at the proposed price. Rejection results in no sale, in 1which case each player Deceives zero payoff. Both players discount period 2 payoffs 1with a discount factor 5 E {ml}: if a sale occurs at price p] in period 1, then the seller and the buyer collect p1 and 1 p1, respectively; but ifasale occurs at price p; in period 2, the parties collect JP}; and 1511313], respectively. {a} For any p E [1}, 1]., show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which a sale occurs at price p in period 1. {b} Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria {SPNE}. [You must describe the associated strategy prole, and prove that it is a SPNEJ