Please help me with this question!

We consider the following situation between 2 rms. Firm A [the \"arqtrer\"} would Lil-re to take over firm T {the \"target\"]. It does not know rm T's value: it believes that this value, wh- firm T is controlled by its own ]:lia.n.a.geme1:lt1 is at least $1} and at mnst $1131], and amigns equal probability to each of the dollar values in this range [we assume that the value is distributed uniformly on this interval}. Firm T will be worth 'l more under rm A's management than it is under its own management. Suppose that rm A bids p to take over rm T; and rm T is wnrth .1- [under its own management}. Then if T accepts A's offer, A's payoff is 23.1: p and T's pawn]? is p; if T rejects A's offer. A's payoff is I} and T's paypis :r. {a} Draw the extensive form of this Bayesian game. [b] Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game