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Consider market for masks. Not everyone values the mask equally: marginal private benet is 100 Q and marginal private costs are given by 20 (per Q). Given that wearing masks will help reduce spread of virus, marginal benet to others is 1130 = 50 (per Q). o 3.. Draw the marginal private benet (MPB) marginal social benet (MSB), marginal private cost (MPG), and marginal social cost (MSG) curves on a graph. labeling clearly the axes and intercepts. Pay close attention to what is on the Xiaxis and yiaxis. _ ' o b. What is the equilibrium amount of masks? What is the eicient level? 0 c. What is the deadweight loss (D'WL) caused by the externality? Shade in the area. of the DWL on the graph from part (a). What is the welfare gain from moving to the efcient level of Q? o d. For which good is a market absent in this case? Government solution: Suppose the government steps in and decides to correct the externality by subsi dizing masks. o e. Suggest a Pigouvian tax that would induce the efcient consumption. What is the optimal tax rate per unit, and how much subsidy is needed? Market solution: The Cease theorem states that \"the eicient outcome should occur regardless of which party has the property rights,\" implying that the market can potentially solve externalities by itself (no need for the government to step inl). o f. Interpret the Cease theorem in the context of this question. What are ways in which the Cease theorem could fail? Give some examples in the context of this question. I (20 points) The market inverse demand curve is P(y) = 10 - 2y, and a monopolist's cost curve is y2 + 2. (a) What output level y maximizes the monopolist's revenue? What output level y maximizes the monopolist's profit? Identify which of the two output levels is lower, and explain why using economic intuition. (b) Suppose a second firm with cost curve y + 2 is considering entering the market. If after entry, the firms would compete a la Cournot, what would be the Cournot- Nash equilibrium output levels y1 and y2 of firms 1 and 2? What would be the equilibrium profits for each firm? Will firm 2 choose to enter the market? (c) Suppose that if firm 2 enters, both firms collude, choosing output levels that maxi- mize total profits and then split the profits equally between them. What would be the profits to each firm? Will firm 2 choose to enter the market in this case?(20 points) The market inverse demand curve is P(y) = 10 - 2y, and a monopolist's cost curve is y2 + 2. (a) What output level y maximizes the monopolist's revenue? What output level y maximizes the monopolist's profit? Identify which of the two output levels is lower, and explain why using economic intuition. (b) Suppose a second firm with cost curve y + 2 is considering entering the market. If after entry, the firms would compete a la Cournot, what would be the Cournot- Nash equilibrium output levels y1 and y2 of firms 1 and 2? What would be the equilibrium profits for each firm? Will firm 2 choose to enter the market? (c) Suppose that if firm 2 enters, both firms collude, choosing output levels that maxi- mize total profits and then split the profits equally between them. What would be the profits to each firm? Will firm 2 choose to enter the market in this case?4. (a) Division- AY of STATUSLINE Ltd. is a profit centre which produces four products M, N, O and P, Each product is sold in the external market also. Data for the products are: Particulars M N O P Market price per unit (() 300 292 280 260 Variable production cost per unit ({) 260 200 180 170 Labour hours required per unit (hrs.) 2 3 Product P can be transferred to Division-BZ, but the maximum quantity that may be required for transfer is 2,500 units of P. The maximum sales in the external market are: M-2800 Units; N-2500 Units; O-2300 Units; and P-1600 Units. Division-BZ can purchase the same product at a price of