Please help with (1.A.ii)

1. Court Imposed Breach Remedies. Below is a depiction of the underlying game between two firms. (1.A) Firm B Invest (1) Not Invest (N) Firm A ZI, Zz Y1, X2 Invest (I) (6, 6) (-15, 40) X1, Y2 (33, Not Invest (N) -10) (0, 0) In addition, suppose that the players contract in a setting of court-imposed breach remedies. The players can therefore write a formal (incomplete) contract specifying the strategy profile they intend to play; the court then observes their behavior in the underlying game and if one of them cheated, imposes a breach transfer. (1_A.i) What is the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game in terms of strategies and payoffs? (2 points) (1.A.ii) Write out the resulting payoffs associated with the induced game under the assumption that the court imposes restitution damages. Can a contract specifying (I, I) be enforced as a NE? Explain. (5 points) Firm B Invest (1) Not Invest (N) Firm A Invest (1) Not Invest (N)